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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to estimate the changes in employment 
that will be required across sectors, occupations, and locations within 
the U.S. economy as a result of a North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Such changes will undoubtedly occur as 
reduced trade barriers among the members of a NAFTA-the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico-cause expanded trade among them and 
the need for certain industries to expand and for others to contract. 
These changes could also prove quite costly to the workers involved, 
to the extent that they find it difficult to transfer from declining to 
expanding sectors. Since it may fa11 to the U.S. govemment to assist 
workers in this process of adjustment, it is important to estimate not 
only where that adjustment will be needed, but also what the attendant 
costs will be. This study, therefore, provides such estimates and 
examines the feasibility of meeting these needs within the existing 
programs of labor adjustment assistance in the United States. 
Negotiations for a U.S.-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement were 
initiated following the Congressional approval of "fast t rack 
negotiating authority in late May 1991. These negotiations were 
completed in August 1992. The prospective NAFTA is an historie 
moment because it provides an opportunity to enhance the aggregate 
economic welfare of the three nations involved. The gains in welfare 
will come from a variety of sources that will be mutually reinforcing: 
(1) improved allocation of resources and lower prices to consumers 
and business firms; (2) realization of economies of large scale 
production in manufacturing; (3) reductions in transactions costs and 
in the uncertainty of govemment policies; and (4) dynarnic changes 
resulting from improvements in the business environment, added 
investments in physical and human capital, and technological progress. 
There will also be significant noneconomic benefits from a NAFTA 
as the three nations are drawn more closely together politically and 
are thus better able to pursue cornrnon interests among themselves 
as weil as globally. 
Although there currently exist other free trade areas (FTAS) 
elsewhere, an agreement between the United States and Canada on 
the one hand and Mexico on the other hand presents some unique 
challenges due to the great disparities between Mexico and the other 
two countries in income levels, resource endowments, and 
environmental, health, safety, and labor laws and standards. Special 
fears in the United States and Canada conceming a NAFTA include 
a possible fa11 in wages, welfare losses from significant reallocation 
of labor from labor-intensive to capital-intensive occupations, and 
capital relocation to Mexico due to lower Mexican wages and 
ostensibly more lax labor standards. Concern has also been expressed 
that a NAFTA might result in environmental degradation due to the 
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inadequate enforcement of environmental regulations in Mexico and 
to the possible shift of investment to Mexico to avoid the more 
stringent and costly regulations in the United States and Canada. In 
light of the foregoing considerations, it is useful to evaluate the overall 
impact of a NAFTA, identify those groups of workers, industries, and 
geographic regions that may experience difficulties in adjusting to the 
changes brought about by a NAFTA, and devise policies that will help 
to ease the transition. 
The purpose of this study is to provide some estimates of the sectoral 
employment effects and the regional/occupational employment 
realignments that may occur in the United States as a consequence 
of a NAFTA. The various U.S. policy options for worker adjustment 
assistance that may be pertinent to the implementation of a NAFTA 
are also assessed. The study concentrates in particular on the effects 
of the elimination or reduction of trilateral NAFTA tariffs, nontariff 
baniers (NTBs), investment restrictions arnong the United States, 
Mexico. and Canada, and changes in cross-border migration. There 
are severa1 additional issues. though, that may be quite important in 
the NAFTA negotiations but that lie outside the scope of the study. 
These include: (1) new and possibly more liberal and transparent rules 
and procedures involving trilateral trade and investment in automobiles 
and parts; (2) access to energy products; (3)  different types of 
services(e.g., banking, financia1 cervices, trucking, etc.); (4) 
arrangements for the settlement of disputes that might arise in trilateral 
trade and investment relations; and (5) the effects of differences in 
labor standards and environmental regulations and enforcement in 
Mexico as compared to the United States and canada." 
1) This tendency for shifting resources based on factor intensity will not hold, however, 
for every individual sector. Sectoral changes wiii depend on the particular trade 
It must be emphasized that the study is an analysis only, of the 
effects of the NAFTA itself. Many other changes are already underway 
in the economies involved, especially in Mexico, that are also causing 
changes in pattems of employment across the United States. In 
particular, the liberalization of the economic environment within 
Mexico is already causing that economy to grow and to restructure 
itself in a variety of ways that are changing its volume and pattem 
of trade with the United States. These changes and their implications 
for employment are not included in the present analysis, for they are 
already occurring and presumably will continue with or without the 
NAFTA. The analysis therefore, if it leads to results that sometimes 
appear to be surprisingly small, does so because the NAFTA itself 
may be of only relatively minor importante compared to the many other 
changes that are occurring independently. 
In this context it must be understood that the results to be reported 
below, especially for changes in employment, are not forecasts of the 
employment changes that will actually occur over the future. Many 
such changes will occur for reasons other than the NAFTA, and these 
could well be much larger than the ones reported here. The changes 
presented in this study, as due to the NAFTA should be rinderstood 
accordingly as being relative to what would happen othenvise if the 
NAFTA were not put in place. 
barriers that are in place and the extent to which they are removed in a NAFTA. 
Thus, for exarnple, while one would expect most labor-intensive sectors in Mexico 
to expand, particular labor- intensive sectors that happen to face low protection 
abroad, or high protection that is not removed, may not share in this expansion. 
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11. Analyzing the Economic Impact of a NAFTA 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to identify the 
qualitative implications of a NAFTA for the United States, Mexico, 
and Canada. Mexico is, of course, labor abundant relative to the United 
States and Canada. Therefore it is to be expected that trade 
liberalization will stimulate production of the labor-intensive sectors 
in Mexico and shift labor into the capital-intensive sectors in the 
United States and Canada.' Productive resources will then pre- 
sumably be allocated more efficiently as compared to the pre- NAFTA 
position as each nation specializes in the production of tradable goods 
in which it has a comparative advantage. Welfare irnprovement for 
each country as a result of NAFTA liberalization thus appears likely. 
There may of course be transition costs once an agreement is in 
place, but these costs are not expected to be large, particularly for the 
United States. What is important to note is that the Mexican economy 
is so much smaller than the U.S. economy. It thus appears unlikely 
that even a substantíal percentage increase in Mexican exports to the 
United States would noticeably alter U.S. production levels in most 
sectors, including such sensitive sectors as agriculture and clothing. 
The impact of a NAFTA on the terms of trade - that is, the relation 
between export prices and import prices - will also play a key role 
in determining the welfare effects for the countnes involved. The 
NAFTA countries can be expected to enjoy a terms-of-trade gain at 
the expense of the rest of the world insofar as intra-NAFTA trade 
will increase. The reason is that th6 NAFTA countries will reduce 
supply to and demand from the rest of the world, thereby worsening 
the latter's terms of trade. Within NAFTA, the countries that reduce 
tl-ieir trade baniers the most will tend to experience a deterioration 
in their terms of trade. Since, as will be noted below, U.S. tariffs facing 
both Mexico and Canada are comparatively low, the United States rnay 
experience a tems-of-trade gain relative to its two NAFTA trading 
partners. 
Beyond the conventional welfare gains from sectoral specialization 
and the effects stemrning frorn changes in the terms of trade, trade 
liberalization brought about by a NAFTA rnay have a "pro- 
competitive" effect on domestic firms, resulting in additional gains from 
the realization of economies of large scale production. When firms are 
protected by tariffs from foreign competition, they rnay take advantage 
of their market power by raising prices and reducing their domestic 
sales. The result is that protected firms rnay produce at levels below 
their minimum-cost plant size. Trade liberalization should then bring 
about competitive pressures on formerly protected firms and induce 
them to raise production and productivity and to achieve more efficient 
plant size and lower per unit costs. These effects will be reinforced 
to the extent that the NAFTA liberalization lowers the cost to firms 
of their production inputs that are traded among the NAFTA members. 
Greater sectoral specialization can also be expected to narrow the 
wage gap between the United States and Mexico, thus possibly 
reducing imrnigration pressure on the United States. In pnnciple, a 
narrowing of the wage gap rnay come about by lowering wages for 
U.S workers, but this outcome is not inevitable. Given the disparity 
of size, the ability of Mexican exports to affect the United States rnay 
be limited in any event. But downward pressure on U.S. wages rnay 
be offset by a fa11 in the prices of U.S. imports, which improves the 
purchasing power of a given wage. There rnay also be a favorable 
impact on U.S. wages due to realization of economies of scale. 
One would also normally expect greater specialization to draw 
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returns to capital closer together, raising them in the United States 
and reducing them in Mexico. As the United States expands exports 
and therefore production in capital-intensive sectors, the increased 
demand for capital should raise its return, while the opposite could be 
expected to happen in Mexico. In fact, however, as will be noted below, 
our calculations indicate a rice in returns to capital in both countries. 
In Mexico it appears that the benefits of economies of scale outweigh 
the losses due to intersectoral specialization. It is quite conceivable, 
therefore, that both labor and capital may gain from a NAFTA in both 
countries. 
111. The NAFTA CGE ~odel' ' 
In order to analyze the sectoral employment effects of a NAFTA, 
a specially constructed economic model will be used. The type of model 
is known technically as a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 
The advantage of using a CGE model is that it permits analysis of 
both economy-wide and sectoral impacts. It takes into account a 
variety of indirect effects that occur due to interindustry relations 
within countries and also due to international trade effects that take 
place among countries as relative prices are changed. 
The NAFTA CGE model used in this study is an extension of the 
model constructed by Brown and Stern (1989) to analyze the economic 
effects of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA)."' Countries 
2) Readers who are not concerned with the technical details of the model being used 
may wish to proceed to the results of the analysis reported in the sections 
immediately following. 
3) See USITC (1992) for a surnmary of the technical properties and results of the 
in the model are aggregated into three broad groups. Each of the 
NAFTA members (United States, Canada, and Mexico) is modeled 
individually, a group of 31 other major industrialized and developing 
countries are combined to create a fourth country, and the remaining 
countries of the world are consigned to a residual nest-of-the-world. 
The sectoral coverage in each country/region includes 23 "tradable" 
(import/export) product categories covering agriculture and 
manufacturíng and 6 "nontradable" categories covering services and 
govemment. 
Each sector in the model is characterized as being either perfectly 
competitive or monopolistically competitive with free entry. The 
products that are produced and traded are assumed to be differentiated, 
either by country of origin or by firm, to correspond to the two market 
str~ctures.~ '  The reference year for the data base of the model is 1989.~' 
The input-output relations used in the model refer to 1977 for the 
United States. 1980 for Mexico, and 1976 for canada." More complete 
NAFTA CGE model as well as several other related models that have been used 
for computational analyses of the implications of a NAFTA. 
4) Issues of the modeling of market stmctures are discussed in Brown and Stem (1989). 
5) These data for 1989 were the latest available for al1 the countries included in the 
model at the time the study was initiated. 
6) The 1977 input-output table for the United States and the 1980 input-output table 
for Mexico were the most recent officially published tables available when the study 
was initiated. A 1985 input-output table exists for Mexico, but it could not be used 
because it contained data only for domestic transactions. The authors of the present 
study are cognizant that there have been significant changes in technology and 
productivity in the past decade or more in al1 the countries included in the NAFTA 
model. These changes would alter the input-output coefficients for particular sectors. 
However, the NAFTA model relies mainly on the intermediate input value shares 
and the shares of pnmary factors (i.e., capital and labor) as data. These shares tend 
to be more stable over time than physical input requirements. The results based 
on the NAFTA model will therefore not be especially sensitive ta the particular 
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technical details and a description of the parameters and data base of 
the model are contained in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (199~1.~' 
There are severa1 important assurnptions that are either built into 
the model or are implemented by the model for the present analysis. 
It is important that these be understood in interpreting the results to 
be reported below . 
Full Employment - The anaiysis assumes throughout that the aggregate, 
or economy-wide, leve1 of employment is held constant in each country. The 
NAFTA is therefore not permitted to change any country's overall rates 
of employment or unemployment. This assurnption is made because overall 
employment is determined by macroeconomic forces and policies that are 
not contained in the model and are not the subject of the NAFTA 
negotiations. The focus here instead is on the composition of employment 
across sectors, occupations, and locations, as determined by the 
microeconomic interactions of supply and demand with the sectoral trade 
policies that a NAFTA will alter. 
Balanced Trade - The analysis assumes that trade remains baianced for 
each country, or more accurately that any initid trade imbdance remains 
constant, as  trade barriers are changed with a NAFTA. This assumption 
is intended to reflect the reaiity of mostly flexible exchange rates among 
the countries involved. It also, like the fuii employment assurnption, is 
appropriate as a way of abstracting from the macroeconomic forces and 
policies that are the main determinants of trade imbalancesn' 
input-output tables being used. For more discussion of this point, see Deardorff and 
Stem (1990, pp. 61-79). 
7) The rnain data used cover trade, production, and employment, and these data come 
from United Nations sources. The model pararneters are constructed from the trade 
and input- output data for the countnes included in the NAFTA model and from 
published studies of trade and capitalíiabor substitution elasticities. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the data and parameters, see Deardorff and Stern (1990, 
pp. 37-45). 
Fixed Relative Wages - As will be discussed further below, while the 
economy-wide wage in each country is permitted to adjust so as to rnaintain 
full employment, the wages across sectors, occupations, and locations are 
held fixed relative to one another. This permits the analysis to focus on the 
labor market adjustments that a NAFTA will require, independently of any 
relative wage changes that may facilitate those adjustments. 
Fixed Labor Supply - Except in Section XI that allows for intemational 
migration, the total labor supply in each country is assumed to be held fixed 
in the analysis. This is not to say that changes in labor supply will not 
occur during the phase-in period of a NAFTA agreement, but only that they 
are assurned not to be the result of such an agreement. 
The policy inputs into the model are the tariffs and nontariff baniers 
(NTBs) that are currently (as of the late 1980s) applied to the bilateral 
trade of the United States, Mexico, and Canada with respect to each 
other and to the other two aggregated regions included in the model. 
These tariff rates are listed in Table A-1 in the Statistical ~ppendix.~ '  
As will be noted below, in order to investigate the sectoral employment 
effects of a NAFTA, it will be assurned that the existing bilateral tariffs 
for the three nations will be removed and selected NTBs relaxed al1 
8) The results reported below for changes in total exports and imports may appear 
to contradict this assumption of balanced trade. This is because what are reported 
are measures of the quantities traded, which are relevant for output and employment 
changes. They are not the values of trade, which undergo additional change due 
to changing relative prices. It is the values of exports relative to imports that are 
held futed by the balanced trade assumption. 
9) The tariff rates for Canada and the United States are post-Tokyo Round (1987') 
rates, and those for Mexico refer to 1989. The tariff rates for each country are 
weighted by bilateral imports. An adjustment of the U.S. tariff rates on imports from 
Mexico was made to take the maquiladora imports into account. NTBs are 
represented in tems of import coverage ratios. For more information on the tariffs 
and NTBs being used, see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1 992) and Deardorff and 
Stern (1 990, p. 4 2). 
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at one time rather than in stages. 
When the policy changes are introduced into the model, the method 
of solution yields percentage changes in sectoral employment and other 
variables of interest for the United States and the other countries. 
Multiplying the percentage changes by the actual levels of sectoral 
employment given in the data base yields the absolute employment 
changes, positive or negative, that might result assuming, as noted, 
that existing tariffs are removed and NTBs relaxed al1 at one time. 
More realistically, if the U.S.-Canada FTA is any guide, the removal 
of tariffs and NTBs in a NAFTA will be phased in over a period of 
a decade or longer. If information were available for the different 
phases, the model could in principie be solved sequentially taking into 
account the reductions in tariffs and NTBs for each time period.'O' 
The results reported below will thus provide insight into what might 
plausibly happen to sectoral employment in the United States at a 
nationaI leve1 as the result of a NAFTA. In particular, it will be possible 
to identify the sectors that will experience increases as well as declines 
in employment in both percentage and absolute terms in relation to 
1989 sectoral levels. These employment changes will then provide some 
indication of the numbers of Amencan workers who might have to 
change jobs due to a NAFTA. 
While the bilateral removal of tariff; and NTBs constitute the main 
changes in trade policies that will be brought about by a NAFTA, there 
may be other changes as well. These relate especially to changes in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and to the cross- border movement 
of workers as  the result of changes in the rate of return on capital 
10) Aiiowance would have to be made as weii for adjustment lags between the policy 
changes and responses and for the effects of changes in the stocks of physical 
and hurnan capital. 
and changes in real wages. B is difficult to know how FDI and 
cross-border movements of workers will be affected by changes in 
their rates of return. What is done therefore is to assume that 
investrnent or worker migration change by certain specified amounts 
in conjunction with the trade liberalization that occurs. It can then be 
determined on the basis of these assumptions how sectoral employment 
in the United States will be affected by the combined changes 
engendered by a NAFTA. 
Labor Market Elaboration 
The NAFTA CGE model used in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1992) 
did not include a breakdown of employment by occupations or locations, 
but only by sectors. For the purpose of the present study, a procedure 
for providing such a breakdown has been appended to the model. As 
will be discussed in more detail below, data on the distribution of U.S. 
employment across industries, occupations, and states were used to 
allocate the employment changes produced by the CGE model across 
these severa1 dimensions. Thus it is possible to provide estimates of 
how a NAFTA,, under various assurnptions about its implementation 
and effects, will alter patterns of employment not only across 
industries, but also across major occupational categories, across 
geographic regions and states of the United States, and across 
occupatiodregion and occupatiodstate combinations. The accuracy of 
such detailed estimates depends, of course, on an assumed constancy 
of the distribution of sectors across occupations and locations, and is 
therefore certainly subject to considerable error. These breakdowns are 
very useful, nonetheless, in indicating the extent of labor-market 
dislocation that may arise due to a NAFTA. 
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In modeling the labor market, it should be noted that the major 
purpose of the analysis is to quantify the extent of these labor-market 
adjustments and dislocations. These adjustments consist first of 
changes in disaggregated demands for labor that then require labor 
to move from sectors, occupations, and locations where demand falls 
to sectors, occupations, and locations where demand rises. In fact these 
movements may be anleliorated somewhat by market adjustments - 
changes in relative wages that bring supplies and demands together 
without the need for such movement. However, these possible wage 
changes and their effects are much more uncertain and difficult to 
ascertain than the quantitative changes they correct."' In any case, the 
substitutions in demand are iikely to be lirnited, while those in supply 
are likely to be large. Therefore it is to be expected that most of the 
labor market adjustments take the form of movements of labor across 
these various dimensions. Thus attention is focused here on the 
changes in labor demands that occur at constant relative wages. 
To implement this assumption, it would be simplest if the money 
wage could be held constant in the calculations. However, to do so 
in the context of reductions in barriers to trade that are unlikely to 
be perfectly balanced arnong countries would lead, in the model's 
calculations, to a certain arnount of expansion or contraction of 
aggregate employment in some countries. A decision was made to 
abstract from these aggregate changes, since in part they can be 
regarded as more properly determined by the stance and 
- - 
11) Such corrections through relative wages depend upon the abilities of both workers 
and firms to substitute among sectors, occupations, and locations of employment. 
What are needed are measures of elasticities of substitution-quantitative estimates 
of how quantities supplied and demanded respond to pnce-in these various 
dimensions. Unfortunately, no reliable information exists on these substitution 
elasticities. 
accornmodation of macroeconomic policies, rather than by the trade 
policies that the model is equipped explicitly to examine. In addition, 
because the model focuses on disaggregated changes in employment 
and their implications for adjustment, the disaggregated effects need 
to be exarnined independently of such aggregates. For both of these 
reasons, then, the NAFTA is modeled as accompanied by adjustment 
of each country-wide wage so as to stabilize aggregate employment. 
That is, the country-wide (money) wage in each country rises or falls 
as necessary to keep aggregate employment equai to the aggregate. 
supply of labor.'" However the relative wages across industries, 
occupations, and locations are at the sarne time held fixed in order to 
identify the corresponding changes in labor dernands.l3) 
Using the NAFTA model, it is possible to calculate severai measures 
of labor- market dislocations, including: (1) dislocations across sectors 
for the economy nationwide; (2) dislocations across occupations; (3) 
dislocations across regions; (4) dislocations across states; (5) 
dislocations across occupations and regions; and (6) dislocations across 
occupations and states. The estimates of sectoral employment effects 
for the U.S. economy nationwide provide the essential starting point 
for identifying where the most serious adjustment problems for 
Arnerican workers are likely to occur as the result of a NAFTA. Using 
12) This assumption of full employrnent thus d e s  out any changes in aggregate U.S. 
employment due to a NAFTA. It is conceivable that the NAFTA may result in 
net job creation, but one would have to make some possibly arbitrary 
rnacroeconomic employment and related policy assumptions to determine how 
aggregate employment rnight change. A case in point is Hufbauer and Schott (1992, 
pp. 55-56), who estimate that about 130,000 additional U.S. jobs would be created 
by a NAFTA. Their estimate is based on a $9 billion increase in U.S. net exports, 
with each $1 billion of net exports increasing employment by 14,500 workers. 
13) No account is taken therefore of wage difference for different industries, occupations, 
and locations that may in fact exist and that will change in response to a NAFTA. 
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constructed estimates of the duration of unemployment and wage 
losses based upon the 1990 Displaced Workers Survey conducted by 
the U.S. Departrnent of Labor, it should be possible to determine what 
the societal costs are for the United States for workers who may be 
displaced by a NAFTA. This will then provide some indication of the 
need for special measures for adjustment assistance for workers in 
particular sectors, occupations, and regions. 
IV. Computational Results - Aggregate Effects 
The negotiations to form a NAFTA were completed in August 1992. 
As this analysis was conducted prior to the completion of the 
negotiations, this study relies on a NAFTA CGE model to explore the 
economic implications of severa1 scenarios that were presurned to 
include some of the likely features of the final agreement. 
The Scenarios 
The scenarios are indicated schematically in Figure 1. They include 
the five scenarios A.-E. plus another four scenarios, F-1, involving 
migration that will be considered below in Section XI. 
A. Tariff Elirnination: Trilateral removal of al1 tariffs on trade among 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This is the base case. since 
it includes the minimal amount of trade liberalization that is likely to 
be included as paint of a NAFTA. 
B. Tariff Elimination and U.S. NTBs Against Mexico Relaxed: Sarne 
as scenario A. plus 25 percent expansion of U.S. import quota lirnits 
applied to Mexican exports of agriculture, food, textiles, and clothing. 
......... n... " &,a .................... . .......................... 6-3f la 
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A partial expansion of import quota limits was chosen, instead of complete 
elimination, because it is viewed that any liberalization of these NTBs 
is to some extent unlikely.14' This scenario has only U.S. NTBs being 
relaxed, to reflect the possibility that Mexico will be accorded some 
preferential treatment due to its developing country status. 
C. Tariff Elimination and U.S. and Mexican NTBs Relaxed: Sarne 
as scenario B. plus 25 percent expansion of Mexican import quota limits 
applied to U.S. exports of agriculture, transport equipment, and other 
particular Sectors. This scenario requires Mexico to yield on NTBs 
in arnounts comparable to the concessions given by the United ~tates."' 
D. Tariff Elimination and Capital Flows into Mexico: Sarne as A. 
plus Mexico is assumed to relax foreign direct investment (FDI) 
restnctions, resulting in a capital inflow from outside of the NAFTA 
that expands Mexico's capital stock by 10 percent.16' In this scenario, 
NTBs are not liberalized. The inflow of FDI from the Other- 31 group 
of countries is motivated by the rise in the return to capital found in 
Scenario A. for Mexico and the fa11 in return to capital in the Other-31 
group.'7' 
14) In the U.S.-Canada FTA, there was comparatively little relaxation of existing 
NTBs.This may also be tnie of a NAFTA, although there is no way to determine 
t h s  until a final agreement is rnade public. It was in recognition of some possible 
expansion of U.S. import quota l i i t s  applied to selected Mexican exports that an 
arbitrary 25 percent expansion of these iimits was assumed. 
15) The sarne consideration applies here as in the preceding footnote. 
16) Very little is known empincally about how FDI responds to changes in relative 
rates of retum to capital. The 10 percent figure chosen is thus arbitrary. A similar 
capital inflow into Mexico was assurned to occur in the KPMG Peat Marwick (1991) 
model of a U.S.- Mexico FTA. 
17) Within the model there is no role for ownership of capital, and therefore no distinction 
arnong various methods of financing a capital expansion. The assumption here is 
only that the real capital stock of Mexico is expanded. Earnings on the additional 
capital are assumed to leave Mexico and go to the Other-31, without regard to 
E. Canada United States Free Trade - Tariff Elimination: Removal 
of post-Tokyo Round (1987) bilateral tariffs on trade between the 
United States and Canada. This case is included for comparison with 
the formulations of the NAFTA in the other four scenarios. 
Scenarios A. - D. represent alternative versions of a NAFTA that 
could obtain with varying degrees of likelihood. Scenario A. is probably 
the most likely, involving only tariff elimination, for severa1 reasons. 
Tariffs are the easiest trade policies to negotiate. There is ample 
precedent for including tariff elimination and not much more in FTAs, 
as in the U.S-Israel and U.S.-Canada agreements that are already in 
place. Tariffs cuts are also the least likely to be resisted by sectoral 
lobbying interests, which tend, because of four decades of GATT 
discipline, to have secured protection instead through NTBs. Those 
sectoral interests are sure to provide stiff resistance to the relaxation 
of NTBs included in Scenarios B. and C. Scenario A. is therefore the 
base case for the analysis, and Scenarios B. - D. represent departures 
from it. 
Scenario E, representing U.S.-Canada free trade, is included for 
comparison purposes. Since Scenarios A. - D. include tariff elimination 
among al1 three countries of the NAFTA, they subsurne the effects 
of the U.S.-Canada FTA that has already been negotiated and is in 
the process or being implemented. It is appropriate, therefore, to infer 
the incremental effects of adding Mexico to that agreement by 
comparing the NAFTA scenarios with Scenario E. Thus the difference 
between the effect on any particular variable reported for Scenario A. 
and the corresponding effect for Scenario E. represents the effect on 
that same variable that would arise if tariffs between the United States 
and Canada were already zero and those countries' tariffs against 
whether these earnings leave as interest payrnents or as returns to ownership. 
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Mexico were then eliminated along with Mexico's tariffs against them. 
None of these scenarios includes cross-border migration of labor. 
Four additional scenarios taking this also into account will be 
introduced below in Section XI. In al1 of the scenarios, it will be recalled 
that the changes are assumed to take place al1 at once rather than being 
phased in over a period of years as would likely be the case in the 
negotiated agreement. A summary of the results for the individual 
scenarios A.-E. is provided in Table 1. 
Trade Effects 
The changes in the quantity of irnports and exports measured in base 
period U.S. dollars are reported in columns two and three and the 
percent changes in the terms of trade are reported in column four of 
Table l. It was noted above that NAFTA countries rnight experience 
an improvement in their terms of trade insofar as intra-NAFTA trade 
would increase. Countries that enjoy such an improvement in the t e m s  
of trade also tend to increase imports relative to exports. This outcome 
is simply a result of the fact that an increase in the price of export 
goods raises the volume of import goods that can be purchased while 
keeping trade balanced in the model. 
The impact of a NAFTA on trade volumes appears particularly 
lopsided for Mexico and the Other 31 countries in scenario D. This 
imbalance is caused primarily by the capital flows assumed to occur. 
The Other 31 countries are assumed to insta11 capital in Mexico, 
generating sizable interest payments from Mexico to them. The 
remittance of interest payments by Mexico must be offset by a trade 
surplus if the current account balance is to remain at the leve1 
prevailing in the base period. The opposite is the case for Other 31, 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY RESULTS OF A NORTH AMERICA FREE TRAOE AGREEMENT. 
CHANGES I N  COUNTRY IMPORTS. EXPORTS. TERMS OF TRADE. WELFARE. ANO RETURN TO LABOR ANO CAPITAL 
(Trad. I n  M l l l l o n s  o f  U.S. D o l l a r s )  
U n i t e d S t a t e i  1 1  8886 1 1  7677.1 1  0 . 3  O. 1 3253.0 O 2 
0 t her  -712.8 -416.5 -0.0 -1858.0 - 1 -0.1 
Canada 4959 O 5771 .o - 0  7 0 6 
Mex i c o  2629 8 2872.2 - 0  9 0.3 0 5 
COUNTRV 
- 
B NAFTA: T a r l f f  E l lm1nat lon  and U.S. NTBs Aoalnst  Mexlco Relaxed 
U n l t e d  ~ t a t e s  1 1  8932.3 1  7745.6 1 0 . 3  O. i 3458 3 O 2 0.2 
Other -714.3 -425.6 -0.0 -1774 7 -0.1 - 0  1 
Canada 4960.5 5774.1 
Mex 1 c o  2674.1 2899.8 -0.9 0 .4  0 . 5  
-0 .7  1  -!3 1 :::::: 1  0 . 5  1  O 6 
A. NAFTA: T a r l f f  E l l m l n a t l o n  
IMPORTS* 
( 2 )  
C NAFTA T a r l f f  E l l m l n a t l o n  and U.S and Mexlcan NTBs Relaxed 
EXPORTS* 
( 3 )  
O. NAFTA T a r t f f  E l l m l n a t l o n  and C a p i t a l  Flows l n t o  Mexlco 
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which increases imports by $6.8 billion but reduces exports by $4.4 
billion under scenario D. 
A second interesting point is that, as expected, the United States 
enjoys an improvement in its terms of trade relative both to the rest 
of the world and Canada. For example, in scenario A.. U.S. t e m s  of 
trade improve by 0.3 percent, while Canada expenences a small 
deterioration of 0.7 percent. The impact on Mexico varies according 
to the experiment conducted. Mexíco's terms-of-trade loss is largest 
under the assumption that Mexico's capital stock rises, as in scenario 
D. as compared to scenarios A., B., and C., respectively. This is a 
consequence of the FDI inflow, which leads to an increase in export 
supply by Mexican firms and a resulting fa11 in Mexican export prices 
on the world market, particularly in comparison to the Other 
:31 -country aggregate. 
Economic Welfare 
The economic welfare effects of the various liberalization scenarios 
are reported in columns five and six of Table l."' It is evident that 
each liberalization scenario is welfare improving for the NAFTA 
countries. For the United States, welfare in scenario A. rises by $2.5 
billion with the assumed NAFTA trilateral removal of tariffs and by 
roughly comGarable amounts in scenarios B.-D. While these welfare 
increases are a relatively small 0.1 percent of U.S. gross domestic 
product (GDP), they are nonetheless indicative that the United States 
stands to gain from the NAFTA. It is also interesting that the United 
States has a welfare gain of $734 million from a U.S.-Canada FTA 
18) These welfare effects are measured conceptualiy as the "equivalent variation," which 
is the change in income valued at base period prices that yields the same change 
in welfare that occurs with the assumed liberalization. 
in scenario E. as compared to the $2.5 billion gain from a NAFTA 
in scenario A. This suggests that the policy of sequentially negotiating 
FTAs with Canada and then with Mexico results in increasing gains 
for the United States. 
Mexico appears to experience the largest percentage welfare 
improvement from a NAFTA. Mexican welfare rises by 1.0 percent 
of GDP under scenario A. and, when capital inflows are incorporated 
under scenario D., Mexican welfare rises by 3.7 percent of GDP. The 
large additional increment to Mexico's welfare when capital formation 
is taken into account is partly a consequence of the realization of 
economies of scale in manufacturing as the Mexican economy grows. 
The welfare results also suggest that it is in Canada's interest to 
participate in the NAFTA negotiations, although the gain to Canada 
of doing so appears to be relatively small. That ís, the formation of 
a NAFTA indicated by scenarios A.-D. raises Canada's welfare by 
somewhat more than the Canada-U.S. bilateral tariff elimination in 
scenario E.'~' 
It may also be noted that the Other 31 countries experience 
comparatively small reductions in economic welfare as the result of 
the NAFTA changes being modeled. This reflects the fact that a very 
large fraction of trade of the three NAFTA countries already occurs 
among themselves, so that the volurne of trade that could be potentially 
diverted is relatively small. Also, given that U.S. tariffs are already 
quite low, the induced preferences in favor of intra-NAFTA trade 
would be small. 
19) Scenario E. assumes that the Canada-U.S. FTA occurs al1 at once in 1989. It thus 
does not take into account the fact that the FTA has been in effect since the 
beginning of 1989. 
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Real Wages and Return to Capital 
The percentage changes in real wages and in the real return to capital 
are reported in the last two columns of Table 1. It can be seen that 
real wages rise in both Mexico and the United States in al1 four 
NAFTA scenarios A.-D. However, the real wage in Mexico also rises 
relative to that in the United States, increasing by 0.4 percent in 
scenario A.-C. compared to only 0.2 percent in the United States. The 
relative improvement increases to 7.0 percent in Mexico versus 0.2 
percent in the United States when capital flows are added in scenario 
D. At least some of this gain is the result of a fa11 in consumer prices 
iri Mexico caused by its relatively large tariff reductions. These 
increases in Mexican real wages suggest that the incentive for 
Mexican workers to migrate to the United States may be lessened 
somewhat. This possibility will be explored further in Section XI. It 
is interesting moreover that the narrowing of the Mexican-U.S. wage 
gap is not accomplished at the expense of U.S. workers, whose real 
wage rises in scenarios A. and D. despite the fact that after the 
formation of a NAFTA the protection of U.S. labor would be reduced. 
One reason for the increase in U.S. real wages is that the United States 
experiences an improvement in its terms of trade, as already noted, 
which raises the value of what U.S. workers produce on the world 
market. Also, there is a small increase in the scale of U.S. 
n~anufacturing production as a result of the NAFTA liberalization. 
It may be noted finally that the real return to capital tends to nse 
in al1 three NAFTA countries in scenarios A.-D. This may have been 
expected for the United States and Canada, but not for Mexico. 
Mowever, it appears that the realization of economies of scale will tend 
to raise the average product of both labor and capital in the Mexican 
manufacturing sector. This is especially the case in scenario D., which 
makes allowance for the expansion of FDI in Mexico. The results of 
scenarios A.-C. that the real return to capital rises most in Mexico 
relative to the Other 31 group suggests that the inflow of capital may 
come primarily from outside the NAFTA countries, not from the United 
States. This suggests in turn that the fear that U.S. fkms will relocate 
to Mexico may be exaggeratedm' This is consistent with the modehg of 
the capital flow in scenario D. 
V. Computational Results - Sectoral Effects 
Sectoral results for each of the three NAFTA countries are reported 
in Tables 2-4 for liberalization scenario A., which refers to bilateral 
tariff removal. As mentioned above, Scenario A. may be interpreted 
as a base case insofar as it seems likely that a NAFTA would be 
focused, at least initially, mainly on tariff elimination, and that there 
would be some degree of uncertainty attached to the changes in NTBs 
and how FDI and cross-border migration would be affected. The 
analogous results for Scenarios B.-E. are shown in Tables A-2 to A-13 
in the Statistical Appendix. 
20) The capital inflow into Mexico is assurned in Scenario D. to take the form of foreign 
direct investment that increases the capital stock across al1 sectors. As noted above, 
this inflow is induced by the faU in the rate of return to capital in the Other-31 
countries and the increase in the rate of return to capital in Mexico. It can be thought 
of as representing what rnight occur if a NAFTA results in an investment boom 
in Mexico. 
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Trade Effects 
The percent changes in total sectoral exports and imports are shown 
in colurnns two and three of Tables 2-4, while the changes in bilateral 
imports with each NAFTA trade partner are reported in columns four 
and five. The bilateral trade changes between the United States and 
Canada exhibit a strong indication of increased intra-industry trade 
in most product categories. The broad sirnilarity between the U.S. and 
Canadian economies in terms of their endowments of labor and capital, 
labor force quality, and per capita income suggest that the benefits 
of U.S.-Canada trade stem primarily from increased product variety 
rather than intersectoral specialization. The NAFTA CGE model, 
which combines both the roles of national factor endowments and 
product variety in the manufacturing sector in determining the pattern 
of trade, allows this result to emerge. 
Mexican imports from its two trading partners rise in virtually every 
product category, whereas its bilateral exports fa11 in some sectors and 
rise in others. For example, the United States reduces imports from 
Mexico in printing and publishing (-0.4%), rubber products (-6.7%), 
iron and steel (-0.4%), nonelectrical machinery (-18.3%), and transport 
equipment (-5.1%). In contrast, U.S. imports from Mexico rise 
substantially in agriculture (10.9%), leather (15.7%), footwear (11.9%), 
furniture and fixtures (10.2%), glass products (14.5%), nonferrous 
metals (35.2%), and electrical machinery (65.1%). These results 
suggest a somewhat stronger pattem of intersectoral specialization for 
Mexico, which would be expected given Mexico's very different factor 
abundance as compared to the United States and Canada. 
The results in Table 2 also suggest that Canada's fear that a 
U.S.-Mexico agreement may seriously erode the position of Canadian 
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firms in the U.S. market may be unfounded. There are only three 
pi-oduct categories - paper products, chemicals, and miscellaneous 
manufactures - in which U.S. imports from Mexico appear to displace 
Canadian exports. Canadian exports to the United States of rubber products, 
iron and steel, nonelectncal machinery, and transport equipment al1 nse while 
Mexican exports to the United States in these product categories fall. There 
are a nurnber of cases in which exports from both Canada and Mexico to the 
United States increase. It is evident in Table 3 that U.S. producers displace 
Mexican producers in four different Canadian sectors, whereas the opposite 
occurs in nonferrous metals. The foregoing results reflect especially the 
different sectoral tariff rates that are applied by the individual countries against 
their NAFTA partners. 
As already noted, Mexico's increased exports to the U.S. market are quite 
substantial in several product categones. However, the impact on total U.S. 
imports is relatively small due to Mexico's small share of the U.S. market, 
as can be seen from colurnn three of Table 2. The main exceptions include 
glass products, nonferrous metals, and electrical machinery, which show the 
largest percentage increases in total U.S. imports. 
Industry Output and Number of Firms 
Columns six and seven of Tables 2-4 report the percent changes in industry 
output and number of firms for each country. These results can also be used 
to calculate the percent change in output per firm by taking the difference 
between these two ~olurnns.~" It is especially worth noting that output per fit-m 
21) For exarnple, in Table 2, industry output in textiles nses by 1.08 percent, which 
is greater than the 0.63 percent increase in the number of firms. Industry output 
faiis by -0.34 percent in mining and quarrying, whch is less than the -0.38 percent 
change in the nurnber of firms. In both of these cases, therefore, output per firm 
nses. 
rises in al1 three countries in virtually every industry, therefore contributing 
to gains from economies of scale. 
Despite the increases noted in intra-industry trade, inter-sectoral 
specialization also emerges, particularly in Mexico. For exarnple, it can be seen 
in Table 4 that output declines in 20 of the 29 industries in Mexico, shifting 
instead towards such labor-intensive sectors as: mining and quanying (4.1%); 
leather products (1.8%); footwear (1.1%); and furniture and fixtures (6.2%). 
The largest percentage increases in output are in durable goods sectors, such 
as nonferrous metals (24.8%) and electrical machinery (53.4%). 
There is also evidence of inter-sectoral specialization in Canada, with output 
declining in 1 1 of the 29 sectors noted in Table 3. The largest increases in 
sectoral output in Canada occur in: leather products (4.5%); footwear (3.4%); 
glass and glass products (18.6%); iron and steel (5.2%); nonferrous metals 
(12.8%); and transport equipment (9.8%). 
Employment Effects 
The employment effects for the United States for scenarios A.-E. are shown 
in percentage and absolute terms in Table S. In comparison to Mexico and 
Canada, whose employment effects are not reported here, the U.S. employment 
effects are more diffuse and are generally small, with percent employment 
declines generally less than one percent in each sector. The only exceptions 
are the glass and glass products sector, with employment declines exceeding 
one percent in scenarios A,, B., C., and E., nonferrous metals in al1 five 
scenarios, and electrical machinery in scenario D. 
While the percentage employment effects provide some indication of the 
relative changes that may occur in individual sectors as the result of a NAFTA, 
it is important to consider the absolute changes in employment in order to 
have an indication of the numbers of workers that may have to move from 
Table 5 
Sectoral Employnent E f f e c t s  on the Unl ted States o f  North Anerlcan Free Trade 
Scenartos A. - E. 
Percentage Change; Thousands of  Workers 
*Total  employnent uas h e l d  f í x e d  by var ta t ton 1n the economy wlde wape 
IS IC Sector 
1 Agr. .  F o r . .  á F1sh. 
2 M1n 8 Quarry. 
310 Food. Bev..  and Tob. 
321 T e x t l l e s  
322 Waarlng Apparel 
323 Leather Prod. 
324 Footwear 
331 Wood Prod. 
332 Furn á F t x t .  
341 Paper h Paper PrOd 
342 P r l n t  h Publ.  
351 Chenlcals 
358 Pett-01. 6 Re1 Prod. 
355 Rubber Prod. 
36A Nometa l  Mln. Prod. 
362 Glass h Glass Prod. 
371 I r o n  6 Steel 
372 Nonferrous Metals 
381 Metal Prod. 
382 Nonalec. Mach 
383 E lec .  Mash. 
384 TPanSD. ~ q u 1 p .  
381 MISC. Manuf. 
4 € l e c . .  Gas b Water 
5 Constructlon 
6 Whole. á Ret Trade 
7 Transp.. S t o r . .  b Com. 
8 F1n..  I n s . .  6 Real Est .  
9 Comn.. Soc..  B Pers. Serv. 
Tota l *  
Percentage Change 1n Employment 
NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA US-Can 
T a r l f f s  7er1f fs  T a r l f f s  T a r l f t s  FTA 
OnlY and NT8s and NT8s and FOI T a r l f f s  
vs Mexlco (both) 
(1) ( 8 )  ' ( c )  (0)  ( € 1  
-0.04 -0.06 0 .05  0 . 3 3  0 . 0 2  
-0.36 -0.34 -0 .39  -0 .49  -0 .18  
-0 .01  -0.03 -0.02 0 . 0 8  - 0  02 
0 . 6 8  0 . 6 2  0 . 6 2  0 .90  0 .64  
O 29 0 .15  0 .15  0.46 0 . 2 3  
-0 .20  -0.22 -0.25 0 . 1 8  -0.04 
-0 .01  -0 .01  -0.02 0.19 0 .07  
0 . 0 3  0 . 0 3  0 . 0 2  0 . 1 6  -0.02 
0 . 1 3  O 1 3  0 . 1 1  0 .16  0 . 2 8  
O 17 0 .  17 0 . 1 6  0 . 2 2  6 . 1 8  
0 . 0 4  0 .04  0 . 0 3  0 .05  0 . 0 3  
0 . 4 2  0 . 4 2  0 . 4 1  0 . 5 1  O 37 
-0 .04  -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 - 0  02 
0 . 2 9  0 . 2 9  0 . 3 0  O 59 0 . 0 4  
O 07 0 . 0 7  0 . 0 7  0 . 0 8  O 02  
-1 .29  -1 .29  -1 .36  -0.85 -2 06 
-0 .02  -0 .01  -0 .01  -0.05 - 0  19 
- 1  66 -1 .60  -1 .70  -3.36 - 1  19 
0 . 0 8  0 .08  0 . 0 9  0 . 0 9  O 02 
0 . 4 6  0 . 4 8  0 . 4 7  0 . 4 9  O 22 
-0.55 -0 .51  -0.57 -1.25 O. 11 
-0 .80  -0 .79  -0 .68  -0.53 - 0 . 9 9  
0 .64  0 . 6 5  0 . 5 9  0 . 4 3  0 5 7  
- 0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0  -0 .01  -0.03 - 0  O1 
0 . 0 3  0 .03  0 . 0 3  0 .02  0 . 0 1  
- 0 . 0 0  .O 0 0  -0 .00  -0 .01  - 0  0 0  
0 . 0 1  O O1 0 .01  - 0 . 0 0  O 0 0  
-0.02 -0 .01  -0.02 -0 .03  -0 .01  
-0 .01  -O 01 -0 .01  -0.01 -O 01 
o 0 0  o 0 0  0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0  o 0 0  
Change 1n Thousands of  Workers 
NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA US-Can 
T a r l f f s  T e r l f f s  Tar1f fs  T a r l f f s  FTA 
only and NTBs and NT8s and FOI T a r i f f s  
vs Mexlco (both) 
( A )  ( 8 )  (C) (O) (E) 
-1.829 -2.349 2.226 13.524 O 776 
-4.154 -3.874 -4.502 -5  642 -2 010 
-0.239 -0.597 -0 .465  1.725 - 0  404 
8 9 5 1  8.221 8 . 1 6 0  11.851 8 4 9 4  
4.390 2.373 2.234 7.077 3 610 
-0.221 -0.236 -0.266 0.198 - 0  038 
-0.016 -0.022 -0.048 0.374 O 139 
0.211 0 .210  0 .118  1.063 -0 .113  
0 .772  0 .769  0 .658  0 9 1 8  1 6 5 2  
1.512 1.491 1 368 1 907 1 584 
0 .638  0.644 0 . 5 7 t  0 .903  0.487 
5.322 5 308 5.172 6 411 4 594 
-0 .072  -0.066 -0.082 -0 .110  - 0  043 
0.905 0.912 0.932 1.826 O 130 
0.419 0.442 0 .405  O 534 O 144 
-2.917 -2.935 -3 093 - 1  924 -4 .680  
- 0  233 -0 098 -0.086 -0 .510  - 1  860 
-6.541 -6.275 -6.676 -13.206 -4 679 
1.566 1 673 1.716 1 818 O 455 
15.631 15 992 15.833 16 435 7 .456  
-14.554 -13.  514 - 15.250 -33.027 2 808 
-20 328 -20.121 -17 387 -13 583 -25.341 
12.755 1 2 9 3 1  11.729 8 6 8 6  1 1 4 7 4  
-0 .047  O 026 -0 .119  -0.516 - 0  105 
2 003 2 128 1 912 1.374 O 722 
-0 .180  0.178 -0 .501  -2.309 - 1  075 
0 .688  0 . 7 8 9  0 .598  -0.053 0 .094  
-1.597 - 1  350 - 1  826 -2.724 -O 806 
-2 834 -2 652 - 3  333 -3.018 - 3  465 
o 0 0 0  0 . 0 0 0  0 0 0 0  o 0 0 0  o 0 0 0  
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It is evident from Table 6 that the greatest expansion of U.S. employment 
due to a NAFTA occurs in: nonelectric machinery; miscellaneous 
manufactures; textiles; chemicals; and wearing apparel. The negative 
employment effects are concentrated in: transport equipment; electric 
machinery; nonferrous metals; mining and quanying; and comrnunity, social, 
and personal services which includes government services. There is 
a tendency for the expansion of employment to be enhanced in scenario 
D., which includes an increase in FDI in Mexico. However, the increase 
of FDI in Mexico also results in larger negative employment effects 
for the United States in electric machinery, nonferrous metals, and 
mining and quanying. It is also noteworthy that the agricultura1 sector 
shows positive employment effects in scenario C., which includes an 
expansion of import quota limits in both the United States and Mexico. 
The inclusion of FDI in Mexico in scenario D. leads to a larger 
employment increase in U.S. agriculture as compared to scenario C. 
There are also positive employment changes in: food, beverages, and 
tobacco; leather products; and footwear. 
These results for textiles, wearing apparel, and agnculture merit 
further cornrnent. The employment results for textiles and wearing 
apparel reflect the different tariff rates applied to these sectors in the 
three countries. For example, U.S. tariffs against Canada are 7.2 percent 
and 18.4 percent, respectively, for textiles and wearing apparel, and 
2.8 percent and 6.2 percent against Mexico. The rates for Mexico reflect 
the relatively high maquiladora coverage that reduces the effective U.S. 
tariff against Mexico. In contrast, Canada's tariffs in these sectors 
against the United States are 16.9 percent and 23.7 percent, while 
Mexico's tariffs are 11.6 percent and 19.8 percent. So for the most part, 
the United States has lower tariffs than the other two countries in these 
sectors and thus has more to gain from tariff removal. At the same 
time, it should be noted that U.S. NTBs are substantial against Mexico 
in the textile and wearing apparel sectors, thus protecting U.S. interests 
from even the tariff changes that do occur, while Canadian and 
Mexican NTBs in these sectors against the United States are taken 
to be zero. Given these data, the U.S. textile and weaing apparel 
sectors show positive employment changes. 
Regarding agriculture, the tariffs that are assurned to be eliminated 
in scenario A. for the agricultura1 sector are relatively low. They are 
highest for U.S. imports from Mexico (4 percent). That alone might 
suggest a small adverse effect on U.S. agriculture. Add to this the fact 
that the United States had only 11 percent and 3 percent NTB coverage 
against Canada and Mexico, respectively, in agriculture, while these 
countries had 20 percent and 46 percent NTB coverage, respectively, 
against the United States. It is not surprising then that employment 
in U.S. agriculture declines, when Mexican NTBs are unchanged, since 
the U.S. tariff is being reduced the most and the (smaller) tariff 
reductions in the other two countries are being rendered partially 
ineffective by their NTBs. 
These results for both textiledapparel and agriculture underscore 
the fact that the analysis here deals only with the effect of the NAFTA 
per se, and therefore depends critically on the existing levels of tariffs 
that will be removed and the extent to which nontariff barríers 
constrain their effects. In particular, as has been mentioned before, 
these effects should not be confused with the effects on these industries 
that may already be occumng as a result or previous Mexican 
liberalization and that will continue to occur whether or not a NAFTA 
is enacted. 
In interpreting these sectoral employment results, one should also 
recall the assumption used in the various scenarios that the reductions 
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in NAFTA tariffs, relaxation of U.S. and Mexican NTBS, and the 
expansion of FDI in Mexico take place al1 at once. If one were to take 
into account more realistically the likelihood that the trade iiberalization 
would be phased in over a decade or more and that the expansion of 
Mexican investment would similarly take place over a series of years, 
the resulting changes in U.S. sectoral employment noted in Tables 5 
and 6 would be considerably smaller when measured on an annual 
basis. 
VI. Computational Results - Occupational Effects 
While the economy-wide effects just discussed are useful in 
identifying the sectors that will be most impacted by a NAFTA, it 
is also desirable and important for policy purposes to have more 
detailed information conceming the occupational characteristics of the 
American workers involved. With this in rnind, as mentioned above, 
a procedure has been incorporated into the NAFTA model that permits 
the employment changes to be broken down by major occupational 
groupings. 
For this purpose, the "national matrix tape" was obtained from the 
U.S. Department of Labor. This tape contains two data sets: matrix 
data records and occupation/industry codes. The employment data are 
wage and salary employment. The occupation and industry code 
records consist of occupation titles and 8-digit codes and industry titles 
and 6-digit codes that relate to the 1972 3-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC). 
The tape contains 602 occupational titles, including 491 detailed 
occupations and 111 surnmary occupations, for 1988 as well as 
projections for the year 2000. Nine categories were selected for 
purposes of aggregation for use in the NAFTA model, as follows: 
( 1) executive, administrative, and managerial occupations; 
(2) professional specialty occupations; 
(3) technicians and related support occupations; 
(4) marketing and sales occupations; 
(5) administrative support occupations, including clerical; 
(6 )  service occupations; 
(7) agriculture, forestry, fishing and related occupations; 
(8) precision production, craft, and repair occupations (skilled); and 
(9) operators, fabricators, and laborers (semi-hnskilled). 
The occupational data for 1988 have been concorded from the SIC 
to the ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) used in 
the NAFTA model and have been used to estimate the occupational 
breakdown of the employment data for 1989, as reported in Appendix 
Table A-14. The percentage distributions across occupations appear 
in Table A-15. 
With this occupational breakdown, it is possible to determine the 
occupational impacts by sector of a NAFTA for each of the five 
scenarios that have been run. This is done by multiplying the sectoral 
employment changes in Table 5 by the occupational percentages in 
Table A-15. This will permit identification of the occupations that will 
experience increases in empioyment and those that will experience 
dec~ines.~' The detailed results are recorded in Sables A-16 to A-20. 
The positive and negative occupational changes for NAFTA scenarios 
A,-D. are shown in Table 7. It should be noted that the total changes 
for each scenario in Table 7 sum to zero since, as discussed above, 
- 
22) Further disaggregation of occupational groups beyond the nine categories is feasible 
and could be carried out in case the added details would be useful. 
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aggregate employment is being held constant throughout the various 
scenarios. 1 Note: The employment changes listed sum to zero because 
aggregate employment is assumed constant in each scenario. 
Table 7 
Employment Changes by Occupational Group 
Due to North American Free Trade (Scenarios A.-D.) 











- - -- - - -- 
Note: The employment changes listed sum tn zero because aggregate 
employment is assumed constant in each scenario. 
NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA 
Tariffs Tariffs Tariffs Tariffs 
only and NTBs and NTBs and FDI 
vs Mexico (both) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
It is evident in NAFTA scenarios A.-C. in Table 7 that employment 
of executive, technical, marketing/sales, and adrninistrative/clerical 
workers increases while there are declines in the employment of 
professional, service, and skilled workers. Employment of agricultura1 
workers declines in scenarios A. and B. and increases in scenario C., 
due apparently tobthe expansion of Mexican quota lirnits applied to 
imports from the United States. 
The inclusion of FDI in Mexico in scenano D. leads to an increase 
in employment of marketing/sales and agricultural workers and a 
decline in al1 other occupational ~ a t e ~ o r i e s . ~ '  These occupational 
employment shifts in scenario D. apparently reflect the stimulating 
effect that the capital inflow into Mexico has on Mexican 
manufactunng sectors coupled, as a result, with a lessening of the 
extent to which Mexican agriculture competes with the United States. 
This connection between a capital flow into one country and the 
employment of an occupation in another country is a good example 
of the multiple interconnections that the NAFTA CGE model can 
illurninate. It is further evident in Tables A-16 to A-19 that sectoral 
employment within individual occupational groups nses or falls. To 
trace through these changes, the positivehegative sectoral 
employment effects noted in Tables 5 and 6 should be consulted. 
VII. Computational Results - Regional Effects 
The NAPTA model also includes a facility for breaking down the 
Sectoral employment results by state and region in addition to 
occupations. This is accomplished on the basis of a data sample of 
workers obtained from the Census Public Use Tapes. Each line o£ data 
in these files contains the number of individuals in a particular state, 
census industry, and occupation. The disaggregated occupational data 
have been classified into the nine occupational categones mentioned 
above, percentages calculated for sectors by state, and the states 
aggregated into nine major regions, as follows: New England; Middle 
23) These changes in the nurnber of workers constitute very small percentages of the 
various occupationai categories. For example, the increase in agricultura1 
employment of 11,162 workers in scenario D. represents about 0.4 percent of total 
agriculturai employment. Most of the other percentage changes are even smaller. 
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Atlantic; East North Central; West North Central; South Atlantic; East 
South Central: West South Central; Mountain; and ~acific.'~' These 
percentages were used to estimate the regional and state breakdowns 
of the 1989 employment data, the levels of which are reported in Tables 
A-21 and A-23, with the percentages themselves in A-22 and A-24. 
These percentages were used to calculate the region and state 
breakdowns of the sectoral employment changes from the various 
scenarios."' Because of the details involved, only the changes in U.S. 
employment by sector and region for scenario A. (elirnination of 
NAFTA tariffs only) and D. (same as A. plus increased FDI in Mexico) 
are included here as Tables 8 and 9. The sector/region and the 
sectodstate employment changes, for al1 remaining scenarios, are 
reported in Tables A-25 to A-32. 
It is evident for scenario A. in Table 8 that there are total regional 
employment declines in: East North Central (-5,441 workers); West 
North Central (-17 workers); West South Central (-1,078 workers); 
Mountain (-331 workers); and Pacific (-1,173 w ~ r k e r s ) . ~ '  Within each 
region, there are both increases and decreases in sectoral employment. 
For scenario D. in Table 9, the regional totals have the same signs 
- 
24) The states that comprise each region are: New England: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, 
VT; Middle Atlantic: NJ, NY, PA; East North Central: IL, IN, MI, OH, WI; West 
North Central: IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD; South Atlantic: DE, DC, FL, GA, 
MD, NC, SC, VA, WV; East South Centnil: AL, KY, MS, TN; West South Central: 
AR, LA, OK, TX; Mountain: AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY; and Pacific: 
AK, CA, HI, OR, WA. 
25) As in the occupational breakdowns, the procedure was to multiply the sectoral 
employment changes in Table 5 by the region and state percentages in Tables 
A-22 and A- 24. 
26) The regional changes are very small in relation to total regional employment. For 
exarnple, the decline of 5,441 workers in the East North Central region represents 
only about .O3 percent of total employment in that region. 
Table 8 
Change 1n U.S. Enployment by Sector and Region 
due t o  NAFTA. T a r l t t s  Only 
Scenarlo A .  
(Nunber of Workors) 
1 Agr.. For . 6 F ish 
2 Mln. 6 Ouarrv. 
Sector 
310 ~ o o d .  Bev . and roa. 
321 Tmxtlles 
322 W8artna Amarel 
Reglon 
New Mlddle East North West North South East South West South 
England A t lan t i c  Central Central A t lan t i c  Central Central Mountain Pac l f l c  Total 
323 ~eathe; Prod. 
324 Footwear 
331 Wood Prod. 
332 Furn. 6 F l x t .  
341 Pawr  6 Paper Prod. 
342 Pr tn t  6 publ. 
35A Chem1cals 
358 Potro l .  6 Re1 Prod. 
355 Rubber Prod 
36A Nonnetal Mln. Prod 
362 Glass 6 Glass Prod. 
371 I r o n  6 Steel 
372 Nonferrous Metals 
381 Metal Proa. 
382 Nonelec Mach. 
383 Elec. Mach 
384 Transp. Equ1p 
38A Mlsc Manuf 
4 Elec.. Gas 6 Water 
5 Construction 
6 Whole. 6 Ret. Trade 
7 Transp , Stor . 6 Com. 
8 Fin..  Ins . 6 Real Est. 
9 Comm.. Soc . 6 Pers Serv. 
Total 925 1456 -5441 -17 5204 456 -1078 -331 -1173 O 
Table 9 
Change i n  U.S Ewloyment by Sector and Reglon 
due t o  NAFTA. Tar1f fs  Only Plus 10% Capi ta l  Flov tnto  Mextco 
scenario D. 
(Nunber o t  Workers) 
Total  
Sector 
1 Agr . For . & F+sh 
2 Mtn. b üuarry 
310 F00d. Bev..  and Tob. 
321 T e x t i l e s  
322 Weartng Apparel 
323 Leather Prod. 
324 Footwear 
331 WoOd Prod. 
332 Furn b F l x t  
341 Paper 8 Paper Prod 
342 P r t n t  ó Publ.  
351 Chen tca l s 
358 Petro l  8 R e l .  Prod 
355 Rubber Prod. 
36A Nonmotal Mtn. Prod. 
362 OlaSS b Glass Prod. 
371 I rOn b S t m l  
372 Nonferrous Metals 
381 Metal  Prod. 
382 Nonelec. Mach 
383 E lec  Mach. 
384 Transp. Equlp. 
381 MíSC. M a w f .  
4 E l e c . .  Gas b Water 
5 Constructton 
6 Whole. 6 Ret.  Trade 
7 Transp.. S t o r . .  b Comm 
8 F l n . .  I n s . .  b Real Est .  
9 C o m . .  Soc.. b Pers. Serv. 
Reg 1 on 
Neu Mlddle East North west North South East South west South 
England A t l a n t t c  Central  Central  A t l a n t i c  Central  Central  Mountaln P a c l f i c  Total  
387 82 1 1893 2434 2188 965 1555 868 2414 13524 
-21 -355 -482 -307 -732 -562 - 1997 -893 -293 -5642 
66 263 336 186 274 120 186 6 0  234 1725 
882 1450 495 169 6782 1073 329 124 546 11851 
389 1706 68 1 355 1456 869 668 179 774 7077 
12 52 15 8 4 3 30 16 3 18 198 
90 6 0  4 1 49 40 53 24 2 15 374 
63 103 146 64 171 11 1 96 55 254 1063 
52 94 146 49 176 87 79 41 194 918 
190 317 442 102 329 157 153 19 197 1907 
64 195 196 75 117 40 64 34 117 903 
443 1591 1420 38 1 954 420 546 128 528 6411 - 2 -23 -28 -4 -8 -4 -25 - 3  -12 -110 
112 29 1 347 124 278 138 248 67 221 1826 
16 79 11 1 45 79 38 68 32 66 534 
-67 -526 -484 -4 1 -344 -111 -134 -26 -191 -1924 
-23 -107 -209 -22 -36 -32 -32 -12 -37 -510 
-795 -2071 -4166 -709 -1287 -1117 -1151 -314 -1595 -13206 
152 317 517 124 197 104 141 51 215 1818 
1599 2601 3796 1447 1525 674 1392 691 2711 16435 
-2826 -6252 -8285 -1872 -3605 -1647 -2413 -1148 -4979 -33028 
-917 -1506 -4922 -945 - 1  180 -602 -1014 -279 -2218 -13583 
716 1609 1785 637 1216 493 767 333 1131 8686 
-23 -75 -86 - 38 -89 -48 -6 1 -34 -63 -516 
6 1  154 188 103 260 9 1 220 101 194 1374 
-120 -346 -413 - 189 -37 1 -130 -248 -131 -360 -2309 
-2 - 9  - 9  -5 -8 -3 -6  -3 -8 -53 
-162 -503 -438 -186 -418 -126 -297 -147 -448 -2724 
-179 -501 -516 -233 -520 -172 -295 -160 -443 -3018 
as in TabIe 8, except for the Middle Atlantic region, which is now 
negative. The differences in sectoral results for the individual regions 
in Tables 8 and 9 reflect the inclusion of FDI in Mexico. The main 
sectors showing overall increases or decreases in employment 
correspond to the sectors identified in Table 6 above. 
It should be recalled that these regional effects, like the others 
presented in this report, refer only to the effects of the NAFTA per 
se, and they should not be confused with the effects on these regions 
that may already be occurring as a result of previous Mexican 
liberalization. The Mexican liberalization has already caused expansion 
of trade with Mexico in regions close to the border, and this expansion 
will likely continue. It is not, however, the result of the tariff and NTB 
liberalization that will be carried out in a NAFTA. 
VIII. Computational Results - Occupation and Region 
The Census data also permit the employment changes for each 
industry to be broken down by both occupation and region 
simultaneously. Sumrning these results over al1 industries, the total 
changes in employment by occupation and region were obtained. Thus, 
in Table 10, for scenario A., which refers to NAFTA tariff elimination, 
the changes in employment by occupation are reported for each of the 
nine regions. The totals along the bottom and side of this table match 
those reported in Tables 7 and 8. The declines in the employment of 
skilled and semi-/unskilled workers are evidently concentrated in the 
East North Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific regions. 
In the East North Central region, al1 of the occupational categories 
except marketing/sales show a decline. There are generally positive 
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occupational employment effects in the other regions noted, except for 
agricultura1 and service workers. 
The corresponding results for scenario D., which includes NAFTA 
tariff elimination plus an increase in FDI in Mexico, are shown in Table 
11. The pattern of total changes for the individual occupational groups 
is different from the pattern for scenario A. noted in Table 10. There 
are declines for al1 of the occupational groups except marketing/ sales 
and agriculture. There is now an overall negative employment result 
for the Middle Atlantic region, and the overall negative effects are 
larger for the East North Central, West South Central, and Mountain 
regions. The occupationaVregiona1 employment results for scenarios 
B., C., and E. are given in Tables A-33 to A-35 in the Statistical 
Appendix. 
IX. Computational Results - Effects by State 
The changes in employment by sector for each of the 50 states and 
the District of Columbia are reported in Tables A-28 to A-32. These 
data broken down by state correspond to the data broken down by 
region that have just been discussed. For scenario A., which refers 
to NAFTA tariff elimination, it is evident from Table A-28 that there 
are two states that experience an overall decline in employment in 
excess of 1,000 workers: Michigan (-2,629) and Ohio (-1,404). There 
are four states that experience an overall increase in employment in 
excess of 1,000 workers: Georgia (1,063); New York (1,360); North 
Carolina (2,691); and South Carolina (1,373). In Georgia and the 
Carolinas, these increases are largely the result of the expansion in 
textiles that has been discussed above. In New York, the largest 
Change in U.S Emloymmnt by Ragton and Occupatton 
due to NAFTA. Tar1tts Only 
Scenarto A. 










Reg 1 on 
Neu MiOdle EaSt North WeSt North S w t h  EbSt S w t h  W0.t S w t h  
England Atlanttc Central Central Atlantlc Central Central Yount.'tn Paciflc Total 
O 618- b9C- 2211- 01 6 CBPL ZOBI CBCL- OLS - 8s 1 
8561- 519- 9LL- 981- 66P COPP 062- OCBV- 811- 18 
8 l t V -  9LL- PBC- BLL- 082- ELS 091- ZP81- L6S- VZl- 
E9111 128) CL9 80E 1 98L I t L 1  C9LL 9291 6P9 562 
6E7.l- 891- C8- 9S1- 01- 61 06- OCP- 061 - OL- ..~ -.
2261- SZV- 001 - LlC- LL- PPC St -  566- 061 - L9- 
015) 9s) OL L91 SL OS2 6 t l  9CZ EZC V8 
L6V- C91- SP- PC1- P 1, S 1 EIZ- 6- 9 
9081- LVE- L21- CSC- 8C- 801 - 9C - 196- LVI - 9L- 
CEE- ILZ- 88- CLZ- 62- 1 LL E- SLP- 6 S2 
I Y a O l  a1413ed uteaunon (oJaue3 IUJlUe3 i O U o l & V  IRJ&Ue3 L*JaUe3 ~ I & U O I S V  puet6u3 
w n o s  aseh tonos l s e 3  ronos WJON ase" q a . 1 0 ~  elppln neN 
increases are in nonelectncal machinery and rniscellaneous 
manufactures, reflecting that state's more diverse industrial base. For 
scenario D., which includes NAFTA tariff elimination plus an increase 
in FDI in Mexico,the results in Table A-31 indicate that there are six 
states that experience an overall decline in employment in excess of 
1,000 workers: Califomia (- 1,022); Illinois (- 1,218); Indiana (- 1,673); 
Michigan (-2,091); Ohio (-2,338); and Pennsylvania (- 1,303). There are 
three states for scenario D. that experience an overall increase in 
employment in excess of 1,000 workers: Georgia (1,656); North Carolina 
(3,681); and South Carolina (1,8681.~' 
The changes in employment by occupation broken down by state 
for scenarios A.- E. are reported in Tables A-36 to A-40. These 
breakdowns provide an indication of how the statewide changes are 
distributed across the different occupational groups. Aggregation of 
these statewide changes by region was indicated in Section VIII. 
X. Labor Market Dislocation Measures and Wage Losses 
The results of the different NAFTA scenarios discussed in the 
preceding sections indicate, as one would expect, that a NAFTA will 
favor some sectors, occupations, and locations over others in terms 
of demands for labor and thus employment. This suggests that workers 
will need to move among these various segments of the labor force 
in order to remain employed and therefore, depending on how difficult 
27') The changes in state employment noted are very srnall in relation to total state 
employment. For example, the employment declines of 2,629 workers in Michigan 
and 1,404 workers in Ohio constitute 0.06 percent and 0.03 percent, respectively, 
of each state's total employment. 
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and costly such movement tums out to be, that there could conceivably 
be considerable cost in terms of labor-market dislocation as a result 
of a NAFTA. An important purpose of this study is to quantify the 
extent of this dislocation. 
Unfortunately, labor-market dislocations can take several forms, and 
it is difficult to know which are the most senous and how they can 
be compared. Some workers rnay lose their jobs in particular industries, 
but because they live in regions where employment is otherwise 
expanding, they rnay have Iittle difficulty finding work in another 
industry. Similarly, other workers in contracting sectors rnay possess 
skills that are in great demand elsewhere, and they too rnay be able 
to relocate without significant difficulty. Since one cannot know how 
individual workers will experience these different effects, this study 
instead reports a variety of different measures of labor market 
dislocation. Each focuses on a different dimension of adjustment that 
workers rnay have to make. 
Al1 of the measures are necessanly derived for the level of 
aggregation that is built into the m ~ d e l . ~ '  It could be objected that this 
level of aggregation is too large and that it therefore understates the 
extent of dislocation that will actually occur. For exarnple, it rnay be 
that the employment decline of 20,328 workers in the transport 
equipment industry that is reported in Table 5 for scenario A. is 
actually the result, say, of a larger decline in the auto industry combined 
with a gain in employment in the truck industry. If so, then the analysis 
understates the numbers of workers who will lose their jobs as a result 
of a NAFTA. Were it possible to repeat the analysis using 
-- - - 
28) It should be noted that the 29-sector aggregation used in the rnodel was dictated 
by considerations o£ data availabiiity on employment in UN sources for al1 the 
countries included in the model. 
progressively more and therefore smaller sectors, the extent of 
dislocation as measured here would almost certainly rise. 
On the other hand, as this exarnple indicates, what is important is 
not that the industry be somehow completely disaggregated, but rather 
that the level of aggregation correspond well to the problems of 
dislocation that are being measured. If auto workers are readily 
re-employed in the tmck industry, then regarding autos and trucks 
as separate sectors for this purpose would be misleading. It is therefore 
not clear what the most appropriate level of aggregation may be. In 
any case, comparable employment data on a more disaggregated basis 
are not readily available. 
Labor Market Dislocation Measures 
Thus, the first measure to be reported focuses only on industrial 
sectors, that is, the numbers of workers who will have to move from 
one sector to another, at prevailing relative wages, in order to find 
work. This is calculated for each scenario as just the sum of the 
employment changes for those sectors where employment declines. 
This would be the best measure of labor market dislocation under the 
assumption that the most difficult transition for a worker to make is 
from one industry to another, while changes in occupation andlor 
location are relatively easy. Since the latter assumption is in fact 
implausible, however, several other measures of labor market 
dislocation are calculated to reflect altemative assumptions that 
occupations and/or locations are the most difficult to change. 
Table 12 then presents results for six measures of labor market 
dislocation for each of the five scenarios. Al1 of these have been 
calculated by sumrning the negative entries in the relevant tables, with 
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the six measures defined as follows: 
(1) labor dislocations across sectors - number of workers who would 
have to change indu~tries;~ '  
(2) labor dislocations across occupations - number of workers who 
would have to change occupati~ns;~) 
(3) labor dislocations across regions nurnber of workers who would 
have to change regions;:''' 
(4) labor dislocations across states number of workers who would 
have to change states;'") 
(5) labor dislocations across occupations and regions - number of 
workers who would have to change either their occupation or their 
33) 
region; and 
(6) labor dislocations across occupations and states - number of 
workers who would have to change either their occupation or their ~tate.:~' 
The measure of labor market dislocation across sectors represents 
the number of workers who would have to shift their employment out 
of their present sector to some other sector. For NAFTA scenario A., 
55,760 workers would be affected, and for NAFTA scenario D., 76,620 
workers would be affected. These workers would presurnably find 
employment in the sectors for which employment is expanded, but 
without regard to) their particular occupation or region. Workers who 
29) Derived from Table 5. 
30) Derived from Tables 7 and A-16 to A-20. 
31) Derived from Tables 8. 9, and A-25 to A-=. 
32 Derived from Tables A-% to A-32. 
33) Derived from Tables 10, 11. and A-33 to A-35. This is smaller than the sum of 
measures (2) and (3) by the number of workers who must change both occupation 
and region. 
34) Derived from Tables A-36 Lo A-@. This is smaller than the sum of measures 
(2) and (4) by the number of workers who must change both occupation and state. 
Table 12 
U.S. Labor Market Dislocation Mensures 
(Numbers of Workers over Ten Yesrs) 
Across Sectnrs I 5ñ763 54089 53632 76623 14619 
1. 
Labor Dislocation 
Across Occupations 1 4303 3996 3800 12673 4048 
NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA US-Can 
Tariffs Tariffs Tariffs Tariffs FTA 
only and NTBs and NTBs and FDI Tnriffs 
vs Mexico (both) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Across Regions 1 8041 7304 6934 10365 7964 
Across Skites 1 10220 9480 9335 13763 9035 
Across Occupation and Region I loog2 9369 9170 18918 9869 
Across Occupation and Staie 1 12501 11797 11677 21681 11 072 
*In each case, dislocation is measured as the sum of the negative employment changes in sectors, occupations, etc. Since 
employment changes for occupations, regions, and states are constructed from those for secbrs, it would be inappropriaie to add 
the numbers in the table. 
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would have to change occupation and possibly move across 
regiondstates as well would probably experience the most severe 
dislocation. But it is interesting that the labor market dislocation 
measures across occupations, across regions/states, and across 
occupation and regiondstates are al1 considerably smaller than the 
intersectoral employment shifts noted. 
Comparing across the scenarios, it is notable that the greatest 
numbers of workers are dislocated, in terms of any of the measures, 
by the formation of the full NAFTA together with induced FDI into 
Mexico (scenario D.). The dislocations associated with NAFTA tariff 
removal and with expansion of import-quota limitations in the United 
States and Mexico are roughly comparable. It is interesting that in 
scenario E., which refers to a U.S.-Canada FTA only, the sectoral 
dislocation is smaller than with a NAFTA, but is comparable to the 
other NAFTA dislocation effects in scenarios A.-C. 
It should also be noted that these results for labor-market 
dislocation are really very small. Total employment in the United States 
is 116 rnillion workers in the data base for 1989. Thus even the largest 
measure of labor-market dislocation reported - 76,620 workers for 
dislocation across industries due to a NAFTA with FDI in Mexico - 
is less than one tenth of one percent of the labor force. Since, as will 
be discussed below, there are a number of reasons to expect that even 
this is an overestimate, the calculations noted suggest that labor 
market dislocation due to a NAFTA will not be a serious problem. 
Wage Losses Due to Labor Market Dislocation 
The various employment changes reported in the foregoing tables 
can also be used to calculate estimates of wage losses due to the 
different NAFTA scenarios. For this purpose, data have been drawn 
from the January 1990 Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) that provides 
information on the wage before displacement and the duration of 
~nemployment.'~' It is then possible to calculate the average wages lost 
by sector, occupation, region, and state to correspond with the 
categories used in the employment change calculations. The 
calculations of the average wages lost for each of these categories are 
shown in Tables A-41 to A-44 in the Statistical Appendix. 
Assuming that this experience would be characteristic of the workers 
who would experience displacement as the result of a NAFTA, one 
can then multiply the number of displaced workers times the average 
wage loss. The results are reported in Table 13.That is, for each of 
the workers identified as displaced in Table 12. the data from Tables 
A-41 to A-44 have been used to calculate the cost to them of their 
displacement. In the case of labor dislocation across industries, for 
example, the decline in employment in each contracting sector was 
multiplied by the lost wages per displaced worker in that sector, and 
the results were then sumrned over al1 contracting sectors. Sirnilarly, 
labor dislocation across occupations, regions, and states was obtained 
by using the lost wages for these categories to value the declines in 
employment in those where employment contracted. In the final two 
measures that combine occupations with locations, a simple average 
of the lost wages for these two categories was used.%' 
35) The DWS, which'is conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, is a special 
supplement to the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). For an analysis and 
compilation of the evidence based on the January 1984,1986, 1988, and 1990 DWS, 
see Podgursky (1991). 
36) These calculations of wage losses do not take into account the charactenstics of 
individual workers and the ease or difficulty experienced in finding new 
employment. Rather, the wage losses should be interpreted as representing the 
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It can be seen for NAFTA scenarios A. and D. that the total wage 
losses over ten years across sectors are $285.4 and $392.8 million, 
respectively. For NAFTA scenarios B. and C., the wage losses across 
sectors are $274.3 rnillion and $278.8 million, respectively. For a 
U.S.-Canada FTA in scenario E., the wage loss across sectors is $223.4 
rnillion. 
In interpreting these sectoral wage loss calculations, it should be 
noted that they are based on the assumed introduction of the NAFTA 
al1 at one time. Realistically, of course, the NAFTA would be phased 
in over a period of a decade or more, depending on what is actually 
decided in the negotiations. If the effects were spread uniforrnly, it 
might be assumed that about one-tenth of the wage losses indicated 
would be experienced in any given year. But even this may be an 
exaggeration of the wage loss since no account is taken here of worker 
attrition due to voluntary quits and retirement decisions. Further, no 
allowance has been made for sectoral relative wage adjustments that 
would affect worker incentives for changing employment between 
sectors. 
Later in the report, these costs of labor market. dislocation will be 
compared with the resources that are available through various 
programs of adjustment assistance in the United States. For that 
purpose, based upon these results in Table 13, a plausible upper bound 
on the wage loss due to a NAFTA appears to be $40 rniliion annually. 
This is based on the largest entry in Table 13, assumed to be spread 
uniforrnly over a phase-in period of ten y e a r ~ . ~ '  
average expenences of displaced workers during the period in 1989 covered by the 
DWS. 
37) It is conceivable that the labor market dislocations and associated wage losses could 
be concentrated more in some years than in others, depending upon time lags in 
the adjustment process in the labor market and in additions to sectoral capital stocks. 
Table 13 






Across Occupation and Region 
Arross Occupntion and Stnte 
NAiTA NAmA NAFTA NAFTA US-Can 
Tariffs Tariffs Tariffs Tariffs FTA 
only and NTBs Bnd NTBs and FDI Tariffs 
vs Mexico (both) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
285.35 274.30 278.84 392.92 223.36 
14.07 11.83 14.38 49.79 15.46 
33.87 30.79 28.94 43.12 33.73 
41.18 38.20 37.17 52.91 41.66 
38.42 34.98 36.09 75.19 38.94 
47.15 43.90 45.04 89.45 47.2 1 
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XI.  Effects of Cross-Border Migration 
In the results for the scenarios reported in the preceding sections, 
it was assumed that no change in the total labor force of any country 
occurs as a result of the NAFTA and the U.S.-Canada FTA considered. 
In the case of the United States and Mexico especíally, however, there 
are reasons to think that a NAFTA might have some effect on 
migration flows between the two countries. In this section severa1 
additional scenarios are provided that take migration flows into 
account. These scenarios, denoted through F.-I., are described 
schematically in Figure 1. The choices of assumptions about migration 
that they include require further explanation. 
Determinants of Migration 
There are two distinct and quite different ways that migration rnight 
be affected by a NAFTA, depending upon the interpretation of the 
baniers to migration that exist between the United States and Mexico 
and the expectation of what may happen to these baniers as a result 
of a NAFTA. Implicitly the analysis so far has assurned that such 
barriers exist, and that neither they nor their effects on migration will 
be altered by a NAFTA. 
A NAFTA is not expected formally to change the baniers to 
migration. Under that assumption, however, the amount of migration 
could nonetheless be changed if a NAFTA alters the incentives to 
permeate those barriers. Suppose that the leve1 of migration is the 
result of an interaction between the baniers to migration themselves, 
on the one hand, and the incentive to migrate, on the other, this 
incentive being the wage differential that exists between the two 
countries. Then if that wage differential changes, the equilibrium 
amount of migration will also change and thus should be taken into 
account in the calculation. 
As already noted, the results in Table 1 above suggest that a NAFTA 
will increase the wage in Mexico relative to the United States. This 
then implies that, given a fixed leve1 of resistance to migration, the 
actual amount of migration into the United States seeking the higher 
wage will decline. This is modeled, therefore, as a movement of 
workers from the United States into Mexico. 
The extent of this change should depend theoretically on the 
interactions between the barriers to rnigration and the incentives to 
migrate. A simple assumption, however, is to allow enough migration 
to occur to leave the wage differential between the two countries 
unchanged. This is the approach chosen in scenario F. below, and it 
turns out to involve a movement of labor into Mexico equal to about 
one percent of the Mexican labor force. 
A second and quite different effect is possible, on the other hand, 
if a NAFTA serves to reduce barriers to migration. While it has not 
been suggested that a NAFTA will include any formal relaxation of 
such barriers, many observers do expect that the increased economic 
interactions between the United States and Mexico in other dimensions 
will nonetheless make it easier for workers to cross the border. If this 
is true, since most of the large differential between wages in the two 
countries will in any case remain, an increase might be expected in 
migration from Mexico to the United States. This is taken into account 
in scenario G. below, in which the reductions in trade barriers due to 
a NAPTA are accompanied by movements of labor from Mexico to 
the United States. Since there is no basis for determining the amount 
of migration that would take place in this case, it is arbitrarily assumed 
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that there is a movement of 5 percent of the Mexican labor force into 
the United States. Both scenarios F. and G. combine these migration 
flows with a NAFTA excluding FDI, identical to scenario A. above 
but with migration added. 
Finally, there are two additional scenarios H. and I., which include 
FDI into Mexico along with a NAFTA and migration flows. Since the 
inclusion of FDI in scenario D. above resulted in a substantial rise in 
the Mexican wage, scenario H. assumes migration into Mexico to the 
extent of 5 percent of the Mexican labor force. Scenario I., like scenario 
G., assumes migration of this same amount into the United States, 
together with a NAFTA that includes FDI. 
Cross-Border Migration Employment Results 
The aggregate results for scenarios F.-1. are reported in Table 14. 
It is noteworthy in scenarios F. and H. that U.S. welfare declines and 
Mexican welfare rises when there is a remigration of workers from 
the United States to Mexico. Correspondingly, U.S. welfare increases 
in scenarios G. and 1. when there is out migration of workers from 
Mexico to the United States. The reason for these results is that 
rnigration is assumed to reduce/add to the respective countries' labor 
forces. In scenano I., the increase in FDI in Mexico is apparently 
sufficient to offset the negative welfare effects of the assumed out 
migration of Mexican workers to the United States. The effects on 
real wages and the return to capital are shown in the last two colurnns 
of Table 14. It is interesting that U.S. real wages nse by 0.2 percent 
in al1 four scenarios, whereas the retum to capital falls somewhat in 
scenarios F. and H. with the assumed remigration of Mexican workers 
from the United States to Mexico. 
TABLE 14 
u n i t e d  ~ t a t e s  1 1  8575 O 1 7346 3 1 -7218 8 -0.0 
Other -696.0 -447 O 
Canada 4923.0 5724.1 -0.7 
Mex i co 2594 5 2825 9 -0.9 2376 8 0 .0  O 9 
SUMMARY RESULTS OF A NORTH AMERICA FREE TRAOE AGREEMENT ANO LABOR MIGRATION: 
CHANGES I N  COUNTRY IMPORTS. EXPORTS. TERMS OF TRAOE. WELFARE. ANO RETURN TO LASOR AND CAPITAL 
(Trade 1n Mí l l1ons o? U.S. Oo l l a r s )  
G. NAFTA: T a r i f f  E l im ina t l on  and Out M ig ra t i on  o f  5% o f  Mexícan Labor Force 
COUNTRY 
Uni ted s ta tes  1 1  10422.8 1 9 3 i i . 6  1 O 2 1.1 56052.2 0.2 1 i 
Other -893.8 -306.2 -0.1 -3560.0 -0 .1  
Canada 5127.1 5999.3 
Mex 1c0 2808.5 3104.8 -1.1 -1226.4 í . 8  -1 .0  
-0.7 1 ::{! 1 3917.4 1 -sr 1 0.3 
F. NAFTA, T a r i f t  E l im ina t i on  and Remigratlon o f  1% o f  üexlcan Labor Force 
IMPORTS' 
( 2 )  
H. NAFTA: T s r l f f s .  FOI and Remigrat lon of 5% of  Mexican Labor Forca 
*Exports and imports valued I n  U.S. d o l l a r  basa pe r i od  p r l ces .  
EXPORTS' 
(3 )  
Un i ted States 
Other 
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U n i t e d S t a t e s  
Other 
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Mex i co 
F. T r i l a t e r a l  t a r i f f  removal and labor  m ig ra t l on  i n t o  Mox1co f ra  the Uni ted States equal t o  one percent o f  the Mexican 
labor force. 
G. T r i l a t e r a l  t a r i f f  removal and labor m ig ra t l on  i n t o  tha Untted States from Yexico equal t o  5 percent o? Mexico'8 
labor to rce.  
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Sable 15 reports sectoral employment changes in percentages and 
in thousands of workers for these migration scenarios, F.-1. In addition, 
these employment changes are allocated across occupations and 
regions in Tables 16 and 17 for scenarios F. and G. only. Not 
surprisingly, when labor is assumed to migrate from the United States 
to Mexico, as in scenarios F. and H., employment in most if not al1 
TJ.S, sectors declines, while an inflow of rnigration leads to the opposite 
effect. What is surprising perhaps is that there are a few exceptions 
to this pattern. Even when five percent of the Mexican labor force 
migrates into the United States along with the formation of a NAFTA 
with FDI in scenario I., there are still three sectors in which 
employment declines: glass and glass products (-922 workers), 
nonferrous metals (-8,150 workers), and electrical machinery 2,205 
workers). This is in part a reflection of the small size of the Mexican 
labor force compared to the United States, and also of the importante 
of the investment flow into Mexico. 
U.S. Labor Market Dislocation Due to Cross-Border Migration 
In the earlier NAFTA and FSA trade liberalization scenarios, labor 
rnarket dislocation was inferred whenever the leve1 of employment in 
a cell of the economy - an industry, region, state, or occupation - was 
calculated to fall. This simple approach is no longer appropriate when 
there is migration, since the aggregate levels of employment are also 
changing. What is appropriate, however, is not altogether clear. 
Consider for example a situation in which there is an outflow of 
niigration, as in the United States in scenario F. Overall employment, 
falls, and therefore the sum of the negative employment changes is 
naturally much larger than it was in the earlier scenarios where 
Sectoral  Employment E f f e c t s  On tha Unl tad Statas  of  Nor th  Amerlcan Frea Trade 
Wlth Mlgrat lon.  Scenarlor ( F )  - ( 1 )  
Percentap. Chanp.: NunMr ot Workers 
- -- - 
IS IC Sector 
1 Agr. .  F o r . .  6 Flsh. 
2 Mln. 6 üuarry 
310 Food. Bev..  and Tob 
321 Textiles 
322 weartng Apparel 
323 Leather Prod 
324 Footweer 
331 W W ~  Prod. 
332 Furn. 6 F l r t .  
341 Paper 6 Pagar Prod. 
342 P r l n t  h publ .  
35A chemlcals 
358 P e t r o l .  6 Re1 Prod. 
355 Rubber Prod. 
361, ~ o m a t a l  Mtn. Prod. 
362 Glasr 6 Glass Prod. 
37% l r o n  h 3 t e a l  
372 NOnfePrOuS ~ a t a l r  
381 Metal Prod. 
382 ~ o n e l e c .  ~ a c h .  
383 E1.C. Mach. 
384 ~ r a n s p .  E q ~ i p .  
38A MISC. Manuf. 
4 E l e c . .  Gas 6 watar 
5 Constructlon 
6 Whole. 6 P e t .  Trada 
7 Transp.. S t o r . .  6 COM. 
8 F l n . .  I n s . .  6 Real E s t .  
9 C m . .  Soc.. L Pers. Serv. 
Percentage Changa I n  Employmant 
NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA 
T a r l f f s  only  T a r l f f s  only  T a r l f f s  and T i r l f f S  and 
1% l n t o  Mex. 5% l n t o  u s .  FDI FDI 
5% l n t o  Mex. 5% tnto  U.S. 
( F )  (G) (H) (1)  
-0 .19  0 . 6 7  - 0 . 3 8  1 .O4 
-0 .67  1 .18  -2.04 1 .O5 
-0 .29  1.38 -1 .31  1.47 
0 . 4 3  1 .94 -0 .36  2.16 
-0 .06  2 .01  -1.26 2 .18  
-0 .65  2 .O3 -2 .05  2 .42  
- 0  33 1.62 -1.44 1.82 
-0 .13  0 . 8 4  -0 .65  0 .96  
-0 .13  1.46 -1 .17  1.48 
-0.04 1 . 2 3  -0.84 1.28 
-0 .14  0 . 9 4  -0.85 0.96 
0 . 2 8  1.16 -0.23 1.24 
-0 .22  0 . 8 7  -0.96 0 . 8 5  
0 . 0 3  1 61 -0 .74  1.91 
-0.14 1 13 - 0  97 1.15 
-1 .37  -0 .84  -1 .29  -0.41 
-0.21 0 .92  -0 .99  0 . 8 8  
-1 .S2 -0 .38  -4.64 -2 .07  
-0 .13  1.12 -0.95 1 .13  
0 . 2 5  1 .53  -0 .58  1.56 
- 0 . 7 8  0 . 6 1  -2 .41  -0 .08  
- 1 . 1 0  0 . 7 5  -2 .07  1 .O1 
O. 32 2 .23  -1 .16  2 . 0 3  
- 0 . 4 2  2 10 -2 .13  2 .07  
- 0 . 2 0  1.16 -1 .11  1.15 
- 0 . 3 1  1 .S3 -1.54 1.52 
-0.25 1 .30  -1.29 1.29 
-0 .38  1.82 -1.86 1.81 
-O 24 1. 14 -1.16 1. 14 
Changa l n  Number of  Workers 
NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA 
T a r l f f s  only  T a r l t f r  only  T a r l f f s  and T a r t f f s  and 
1% 1nto Mex. 5% l n t o  U.S. FOI FOI 
5% 1nto Mex. 5% l n t o  U.S. 
( F )  ( 0 )  (H) ( 1 )  
-7.717 27.573 -15.891 ' 42.937 
-7.690 13.567 -23.350 12.079 
-6.169 29.413 -27.927 31,376 
5.629 25.556 -4.755 28.456 
-910 30.886 -19.416 33.573 
-702 2.  186 -2 .209  2.604 
-650 3.151 -2.793. 3.541 
-897 5.747 -4.474 6 .600  
-770 8.483 -6.793 8.628 
-315 10.648 -7 .230  11.043 
-2.407 15.860 -14.320 16.124 
3.474 14.562 -2 .831  15.651 
-428 1 ,708 -1.889 1.670 
81 5.021 -2 .290  5.943 
-832 6.673 -5 .720  6.788 
-3.117 -1.917 -2.925 -922 
-2,119 9.193 -9.938 8.916 
-7.552 -1.485 -18.259 -8.150 
-2.643 22.609 -19,227 22.861 
8.437 51.584 -19.529 52.389 
-20.721 16.268 -63.856 -2.205 
-28.206 19.046 -52.967 25.791 
6.383 44.608 -23. 171 40.538 
-6.962 34.524 -35.087 34 .O56 
-14.404 84.030 -80.651 83.403 
-72 .S32 362 .O90 -364.570 359.958 
-14.775 77.992 -77.357 77.252 
-37.449 177.689 -182.002 176.560 
-87.560 420.841 -426.675 420.647 
Table 16 
Change in U S. Employment by Reglon and Occupatlon 
due to NAFTA. Tarlff ElimiMtion and Pemigration 
of 1% of Mexican Labor Force. Scenario F 
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aggregate employment was constant. Not al1 of this reduction in 
employment is likely to represent dislocation in the United States, 
however, since by assumption a number of workers are leaving their 
jobs voluntarily and crossing national borders. Only in the unlikely 
event that al1 of the rnigrating workers were to leave the expanding 
sectors would al1 of the declines in employment in other sectors 
represent dislocations. At the opposite extreme, if al1 of the migrating 
workers happened to leave from cells where employment was 
contracting, then the appropriate measure of dislocation would be the 
sum of the employment decreases rninus the amount of migration. 
There is no way of knowing from which industries migrating 
workers will leave (and enter, in the other country), and therefore no 
way of choosing between these two extremes. The approach chosen 
is therefore a more neutral course, as follows. It is assurned that 
workers who rnigrate out of a country leave the various employment 
cells in proportion to initial employment there. Thus the direct effect 
of emigration of some percentage of the aggregate labor force is 
assumed to be a voluntary decline in employment by that sarne 
percentage in every part of the economy, and these direct employment 
reductions are not regarded as dislocations in that country. Only 
employment decreases in excess of this percentage are taken as 
dislocations, and it is these that are aggregated to obtain the measures 
of total dislocation reported below. 
A similar assumption is made for aggregate employment increases 
due to immigration. These workers are assurned also to attempt to 
distribute themselves across the economy in proportion to initial 
employment levels. Then if demand for labor in a cell fails to expand 
by enough to absorb these imrnigrants, they are regarded as dislocated. 
Thus. in a cell where demand for labor contracts, that contraction plus 
the percentage of imrnigration are both dislocated. And in a sector 
where labor demand expands, dislocations are zero only if the 
expansion is greater than the percentage of immigration. Note that even 
if the migrating workers themselves are lucky enough to find jobs, 
this calculation takes into account the dislocations of any workers they 
may displace. 
Computational Results of Dislocation 
Tables 18 and 19 report the various measures of labor-market 
dislocation for the four scenarios involving migration. Comparing to 
Tables 12 and 13, it is not surprising that the additional disturbance 
of migration generally leads to greater amounts of labor- market 
dislocation and wage losses. For example, when a small arnount of 
emigration is added to the basic NAFTA run, comparing scenario A. 
(tariffs only) to scenario F. (tariffs only and emigration from the United 
States to Mexico), dislocation across sectors rises from 55,760 workers 
to 75,700 workers over ten years and the associated wage losses rise 
from $285.4 million to $366.2 million. The comparable results for 
scenario D (tariffs and FDI in Mexico) and scenario H (tariffs, FDI 
in Mexico, and emigration from the United States to Mexico) are 76,623 
and 195,210 workers and $392.8 million and $845.8 million in lost wages 
over ten years.3' On this basis, a plausible upper bound on the wage 
loss due to a NAFTA, taking cross-border migration into account, can 
38) Interestingly, the arnount of dislocation does not seem to differ appreciably between 
scenario H. in which 5% of the Mexican labor force moves from the United States 
into Mexico and scenario 1 in which the sarne arnount of labor moves in the other 
direction. However, examination of the sectoral, cccupational, and location details 
indicates that the cells in which these dislccations occur do depend irnportantly on 
the direction of the rnigration flow. 
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be taken to be $80 million annual1y spread over ten years. As was 
the case for scenarios A.-E., it is evident that the dislocations and wage 
losses across occupations/regions/states are al1 considerably smaller 
than across sectors when allowance is made for cross-border 
rnigration. 
Thus, it is clear that the assumptions about cross-border migration 
are important to the detailed results. It is unfortunate that there is so 
little understanding concerning what these flows will be. Nevertheless, 
even though these results indicate a substantial increase in dislocations 
when migration is included, the total dislocations still remain very 
small in comparison to the U.S. labor force and, as will be noted below, 
the costs of these dislocations remain manageable in comparison to 
the total expenditures of various existing U.S. adjustment assistance 
programs. 
XII. Adjustment Assistance for Workers Displaced by a NAFTA 
Providing adjustment assistance to workers displaced by imports has 
long been acknowledged as a desirable goal of government policy in 
the United States. Arrangements for such assistance were first 
introduced in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and have been continued 
in subsequent years. The current authorization for trade adjustment 
assistance (TAA), which is provided in the Omnibus Trade and 
Cornpetitiveness Act of 1988, runs through 1993. 
In order to put TAA in perspective, it should be noted that the 
United States has several other programs that are intended to provide 
help to unemployed and disadvantaged workers. The amounts 
authorized for the various programs currently administered by the 
Table 18 
U.S. Labor Market Dislocation Measures 
Seenarios F. - L. with Migr~l ion 




Across Sta tes  
Across Occupation and Region 
Labor Dislwation 
Across Oeeupation and Sta te  I 14,350 53,590 55.090 SO, 130 
NAFPA NAFTA NAFTA NAFTA 
Tariffs only Tarifis otily Tariffs and Tariífs and 
1% into Mex. 5% into U.S. FDI FDI 
5% into Mex. 5% into U.S. 
fF) fG) fH) (1) 
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Employment and Training Adrninistration (ETA) of the U.S. 
Department of Labor for the 1991 and 1992 fiscal years and the 
President's budget authorization for fiscal year 1993 are listed in Table 
20. It is evident that the main authorizations are for the Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) and the state unemployment insurance (U11 
and employment service (ES) activities. TAA benefits and training 
account for less than 3 percent of the total ETA budget authority. To  
put the U.S. labor market policies and programs in perspective, some 
comparisons with other major industrialized countries may be useful. 
International Cornparisons of Labor Market Policies 
The main features of the unemployment insurance programs in the 
United States, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom are summarized in Table 21. It is evident, as Rosen (1991, 
p. 16) notes, that the United States has the lowest benefits package 
and the shortest time periods as compared to the other major 
industrialized countries listed. Further, it can be seen in Table 22 that 
total U.S. expenditures on al1 labor market programs and, in Table 23, 
U.S. expenditures on training are significantly below expenditures in 
the other major industrialized countries. 
While the United States is evidently on the low end of the spectrum 
in its expenditures on labor market programs, it should be pointed out 
that the United States may rely more on private sector programs as 
compared to other major countries. For this and other reasons, the data 
in Tables 21-23 need to be treated cautiously. As noted in OECD (1990, 
p. 51): 
EW\QymBnt and Train(n9 Adrnln\strat1on. U S. Department of Labor 
Sumary of Budget Authorl ty. Fiscal Years í99í-í993 
iM i l i í ons  of Dollarc.) 
Ftscal Year 
Fiscal Year F lsca l  Vear 1993 
1991 1992 President 's Budget 
Trainlng and Employment Servíces 
Job Tralnlng Partnershlp Act (JTPA) 




Federal ly Admlnlstered Programs 1.078 3 1.174 2 
Homeless Job Tralnlng 12.7 - 9.3 -
Community Servlce Employment fo r  Dlder Amerlcans 390.4 - 395.2 
Federal Unernployment Benefi ts and Allowances 
TIA Benefl ts 
TAA Tralnlng 
Other 
State Unemployment Insurance (UI) and 
Employment Servlce (ES) Operatlons 
Unemployment Compensatlon 
Employment Servíce 
Program Admínistrat ion 122.1 128.3 - 136.3 
Advances 328.0 237 .O 665 O 
Grand Total.  ETA 8.208.3 8.416.0 8.699 2 
"~ncludes S50 O appropriat ion t o r  dlslocated workers + n  conmctlon w ~ t h  the ctean A l r  ~ c t .  
Source: U.S. Department of Labor. Employment and Tralnlng Admlnlstrat lon (ETA) 
Table 21 
International Comparison of Unemployment Insurance Programs 









varies by state. 
Yinlmun of 10 weeks of work 
wlth ~ontrlbutiOns. 
Minimum employment of 3 months. 
wlth contributions. 
HUst be employed for at least 
one year ovar a 3 year period 
Must he rmployed for 6 months 
prlor to layoff. 
Must ba enployed for at least 
one full year. maklng 
contrlbuttons. 
Benef i ts 
Income maintenance payments average 35 to 
40 percent of previous year's wages for 
26 weeks. Beneflts can be extended for 
13 weeks in cases o? severa economic 
downturn. S m e  Job search assistance is 
avallable. Training provided under JTPA 
(EOWAA) . 
Sjxty percent ot prevtous earnings up to 
$680/week Term of coverage dependo on 
employment hlstory and regional 
Unemployment level. No posslbillty of 
extension. Some tratnlng avallable. 
Beneflts basad on length of previous 
enployment. ranging f r m  30 to 75 percent 
Of previous unges. Tralnlng and job 
counsellng aiso avallsble. 
Beneflts range from 63 to 68 percent of 
previous earnings. dependlng on family 
status Benef1t term depends on days 
worked and age. with a min>mum of 22 
weeks. 
Benefits range from 6 0  to 80 percent of 
Prevlous wages. for 90 to 300 days. 
dependlng on worker's ape and length of 
contribution to insurance fund. 
Benefits basad on marltal and fami\y 
status. and not Ilnked to previous 
earnlngs. Can receive beneflts for up to 
one year No extenslons are avallable 
Job Counsel ing and tralning are 
aval lable 
Financing 
Employer contributions vary by state 
Employer and employee contributlons. 
Employer contrlbutlon is 140 percent of 
employee contrlbution 
Employer and employee contrlbutions 
Employer contrlbutions are between 150 
and (80 percent uf employee 
contributions. 
Equal employer and employee 
contributlons 
Employer and employee contributions 
Employers contribute between S and iO 
percent of wages and employees contribute 
between 7 and 9 percent oí thelr vages 
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Public Sector Expenditure on Labor Market Programs as a 
Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 
Major industrialized Countries, 1988 




















"As with al1 attempts to arrive at intemationally comparable micro data 
the principal difficulty stems from differences in the institutional 
arrangements in individual countries. These institutional differences, in turn, 
reflect national traditions, pnorities and customs. The present data system 
emphasizes the quantitative aspects and neglects the qualitative aspects of 
a country's labour market policy. It was already stressed ... that countries 
which rely more heavily on non-financia1 means of public action and those 
in which the private sector plays an important role in improving labour 
market outcomes will appear in a less favourable light in the present data 
set than is actually the case. This, for instante, may well hold for countries 
like Japan and the United States. 
Another important general consideration is that budget figures reported 
here measure only the ex-post amount of public resources spent on the 
various programrnes. Thus, they do not permit a judgement as to whether 















































































Governmen~ Sponsored Training Progiarns for Unemployed 
Adults and Those at Risk in the 
Major Industrialized Countries. 1088 

















in relation to needs. If a country spends little on such programmes, this could 
mean either that the country has no rnajor labour market problems to wony 
about; or that it gives low pnority to solving these problems, or that it does 
not consider the available policy instruments as appropriate and effective. 
Conversely, high spending may reflect simply a sizeable and protracted 
unemployment problem - the effort could still be insufficient, ineffective or 
both. 
In spite of these methodological difficulties, comprehensive budget data 
can be a useful, even if limited, guide for understanding a government's 
approach to labour market policy. If outlays on al1 the major S.pes of labour 
market programmes are included, it is possible to obtain a broad picture of 
the pnorities given by a country within the menu of available policy options. 
The most straightforward interpretation of the data may be to consider the 
relative weight countries place, or have placed, on "passive" income 
maintenance (unemployment compensation and early retirement) as distinct 
Participation 
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from "active" measures to help the jobless find work. Among the active 
measures may be distinguished, as a sub-set, those which improve labour 
market efficiency. Employment services, labour market training, youth 
measures and recruitment subsidies are examples of programrnes airning to 
improve the efficiency of the labour market, and hence of the economy. For 
other types of measures cornmonly referred to as "active" - such as direct 
job creation outside the regular labour market and certain measures for the 
disabled - social objectives are generally the more important consideration." 
Description of Major U.S. Programs Dealing with Worker 
Displacement 
With the preceding discussion of overall labor-market policies in the 
United States and other major countries as background, it is 
appropriate now to review briefly the salient characteristics of the 
major U.S. prograrns that deal with worker displacement. These 
programs include: 
1. Unemployment Insurance (U1) 
2. Employment Service (ES) 
3. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAN 
4. Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance 
(EDWAA) 
Unemployment Insurance (U1) 
As noted by Rosen (1991, pp. 4-6), U1 is the largest and most 
comprehensive of the existing programs. U1 provides up to 26 weeks 
of benefits, equal to 35-40 percent of the previous wage, for 
unemployed workers covered by contributions to the U1 tmst fund. An 
additional 13 weeks of benefits may be authorized if warranted by 
economic conditions. It is expected that workers receiving benefits 
should actively be seeking employment. 
U1 is intended mainly to deal with income losses during 
unemployment. It provides only a lirnited arnount of job search 
assistance. No provision is made for training. Since U1 is designed for 
short-term income maintenance in relation to previous wages, it does 
not take into account the characteristics and situations of individual 
workers who are seeking new employment. 
Employment Service (ES ) 
According to Jones (1991, p. 4), the Employment Service (ES) 
provides information, counseling, job development, and job placement 
services for individuals seeking employment. It is especially useful for 
workers who can be readily empl~yed.~'  
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
Golding (1991, pp. 1-31, notes that TAA is intended to assist workers 
who are adversely impacted by imports. There is a two-step process 
for establishing eligibility: (1) Department of Labor certification that 
involves submission of a petition, an investigation into the role that 
increased imports have played in reducing a firm's sales and production 
and thus worker layoffs, and determining whether the group of workers 
involved is deemed eligible to apply for TAA: and (2) following 
39) See National Comrnission for Employment Policy (1991a,b,c) for an analysis of the 
issues involved in assessing and improving the effectiveness of the Employment 
Service. 
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certification, individual workers are required to apply for and be found 
eligible under specified criteria for the monetary benefits involved in 
the TAA program. 
The TAA program is distinctive in being an entitlement program. 
The eligibility requirements for trade readjustment allowances (TRA) 
include total separation from employment and participation in an 
approved training program. An eligible worker can receive basic TRA 
for up to 26 weeks after exhaustion of available U1 benefits. Further, 
an additional26 weeks of TRA may be available to workers in approved 
training programs. The combined U1 and TRA benefits may thus add 
up to a maximum of 78 weeks of benefits. The TAA program also 
covers allowances for job search, relocation, training-related travel, 
and subsistence. 
The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the U.S. 
Department of Labor adrninisters the TAA program by means of 
cooperative agreements with individual States. These cooperative 
agreements with the States require the coordination of the training and 
other services provided under TAA and the Economic Dislocation and 
Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) program. 
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance 
(EDWAA) 
As Golding (1991, pp. 3-61 states, EDWAA was introduced in 1988 
in an effort to serve the needs of dislocated workers more effectively 
than previous programs had done. EDWAA has been operating since 
July 1989. It is designed as a State grant program with local service 
delivery. It is not an entitlement program. Eighty percent of EDWAA 
funds are distributed to the States accordíng to formula. A mínimum 
of 60 percent of the funds is to be distributed locally and up to 40 
percent can be retained for State activities. Al1 adrninistrative and 
funding decisions are decentralized to the States as a means of tailoring 
the assistance most effectively to the needs of local areas. The ETA 
reserves the remaining 20 percent of EDWAA funds for special grants 
to States in which major job displacements have occurred. The criteria 
for EDWAA eligibility are very, broad and thus cover workers who 
are displaced in a variety of circumstances. It is not necessary for 
eligibility to determine the cause of the dislocation. 
The major services and activities of EDWAA include: 
(1) on-site rapid response in cases of plant closings and mass layoffs, 
with specially trained teams that can provide early intervention; 
(2) provision of basic readjustment services, including job counseling 
and development, job search and placement assistance, and a variety 
of other support and information services; 
(3) establishment of labor-management cornmittees to plan and 
administer adjustment assistance on a cornmunity-wide basis; 
(4) provision of a variety of retraining services; and 
(5) authorization of needs-related payments for workers who are 
participating in an approved retraining or education program and have 
exhausted their U1 eligibility. 
Current Status and Effectiveness of TAA and EDWAA~' 
Golding (1991, p. 3) notes that the TAA program served 42,000 
workers in Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 and 38,500 in FY 1990. In FY 1990, 
nearly 25 percent of workers eligible for and requesting TAA services 
40) The role of the Employment Service in serving dislocated workers under EDWAA 
is investigated in National Cornmission for Employment Policy (1991a,b,c). 
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were also participating in a JTPA Title 111 program. In the two years 
-foollowing its inception in July 1989, the EDWAA program served about 
500,000 workers, and Golding (p. 6,) states that the three-year total 
is expected to reach between 760,000 and 800,000 workers. Further, 
there are significant differences in the job placement rates of the two 
programs, with EDWAA job placernent rates being 69 percent in 
Program Year (PY) 1988 and 66 percent in P Y  1989. This compares 
to a TAA job placement rate of 30  percent in FY 1989 and 32 percent 
in FY 1990. 
In her capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary of ESA, Golding 
concludes (pp. 6-71 that: 
"...the EDWAA program combined with the unemployment system, is the 
best means for responding to the retraining and related needs of dislocated 
workers, regardless of the cause of their dislocation. EDWAA is based on 
experience with earlier dislocated worker programs and studies (including 
a major study by the Office of Technology Assessment) that indicate that 
to be successful, worker adjustment programs should emphasize early 
intervention, build on labor- management cooperation, and provide a full 
range of services. 
EDWAA seeks to provide services to dislocated workers before or soon 
after they lose their jobs so they can retum to productive employment. Those 
dislocated workers who do not qualify for or have ceased to qualify for 
unemployment compensation are eligible to receive needs-related payments 
if they are enrolled in training by the end of the 13th week of the worker's 
initial unemployment compensation benefit period. More than 60 percent of 
EDWAA participants receive training ranging in length from a few weeks 
to several months; others receive basic readjustment cervices and job 
referral. The average length of participation in EDWAA is 19 weeks, but 
10 percent of al1 EDWAA participants receive training lasting 26 weeks or 
more. In contrast, the TAA certification requirement may delay services for 
60 days and often much longer after layoffs begin. 
The early intervention and broad range of basic adjustment services 
EDWAA can quickly deliver are essential to effective adjustment. In addition, 
EDWAA provides an incentive for workers to begin retraining early in their 
spell of unemployment by requiring that a participant be enrolled in training 
by the 13th week of their VI benefit period (or eight weeks after being 
informed that the layoff will extend beyond six months) to qualify for the 
needs-related payments. It is well docurnented that the earlier the 
readjustment process begins, the more effective the adjustment will be. If 
a worker waits too long to begin retraining, job search, or relocation to a 
new job market, he or she may become discouraged, or even drop out of 
the labor market, and the adjustment process thus becomes more difficult. 
EDWAAfs emphasis is on positive and early adjustment rather than 
prolonged income support followed by training." 
It is evident from the foregoing statement that official policy favors 
EDWAA over TAA as the approach to be followed in deaiing with 
unemployment. Indeed, as Golding (1991, p. 3) notes, the Bush 
Administration recornmended that TAA be tenninated effective 
October 1,1991, with a phaseout period for workers receiving TAA 
benefits. Thereafter, trade-impacted unemployed workers would be 
eligible for services provided in the EDWAA program. 
Needless to say, the official view of the Bush Administration favoring 
EDWAA is not shared by all. In particular, state adrninistrators of labor 
adjustment programs and labor union representatives especially have 
argued that EDWAA is seriously underfunded and has been made 
available to only a comparatively small fraction of the total number 
of workers who are displaced each year. Further, a series of case 
studies in 15 states and 30 substate areas during the 1989 program 
year by SR1 International (1992) called attention to a number of 
problems encountered in EDWAA's first year of operation. These 
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problems included weak links between rapid response and 
implementation of early intervention cervices and lack of clarity in state 
policies in establishing priorities among eligible populations.41' 
XIII. Policy Options for Adjustment Assistance Prograrns 
IR light of the expenence with various labor market adjustment 
programs just described, it has been urged that TAA be continued and 
strengthened as a separate program in its own right andor in 
conjunction with EDWAA. However, there are a number of problems 
with the current TAA program, relating to the time involved in the 
certification process, the rather strict cnteria for determining TAA 
eligibility for trade impacted workers, inadequate financing, too short 
benefit penod, the lack of appropriate benefits to cover medical 
insurance and meeting the financia1 needs especially of workers 
approaching retirement, and the difficulties of targeting job creation. 
By the same token, the proponents of TAA emphasize the importante 
of the entitlements for income support and retr~iining.~" 
The question thus arises as to whether EDWAA and TAA should 
be merged into a single program or kept separate. The choice involves 
issues of cost effectiveness in the adrninistration of unemployment 
- 
41) There is reason to believe, however, that many of these start-up problerns have 
since been overcome. See National Cornrnission for Employment Policy (1991a,c). 
42) See the statements of the various panelists in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Ways and Means (1991) and the U.S. Senate, Cornrnittee on Finance 
(1991). See aiso Bednarzik (1991, pp. 6-81 for a succinct sumrnary of the issues 
raised in hearings. There are severai earlier studies deaiing with TAA, including 
Aho and Bayard (19841, Bednarzik and Orr (19841, Corson et al. (19791, Office of 
Technology Assessment (1987), and Richardson (1982). 
policies and programs at the federal, state, and local levels as well as 
political perceptions and priorities in how best to address 
unemployment. 
On economic grounds, it can be argued that the funding and 
adrninistration of programs to assist displaced workers should be 
concentrated in a single program. As discussed above, EDWAA has 
been designed to offer a flexible array of financia1 support and 
adjustment services that may be tailored by individual States and 
localities to address al1 varieties of dislocations and the special needs 
of individual workers. EDWAA is available to al1 workers, regardless 
of the factors responsible for their dislocation. In contrast, TAA is 
predicated on the need to distinguish the trade impacts on workers 
from the many other possible sources of dislocation that occur in a 
large and complex economy like the United States. The experience with 
TAA suggests that the filing, investigation, and certification of claíms 
of worker displacement due ostensibly to trade can be time consurning 
and costly. It is difficult therefore to make a compelling case for TAA 
as a separate program. 
However, the question of whether or not TAA can be subsurned 
under EDWAA raises some important political considerations that 
must also be addressed. As noted above, EDWAA has been criticized 
by representatives of organized labor especially for being underfunded 
and for covering only a limited fraction of the total number of U.S. 
workers who are displaced each year. In contrast, TAA is perceived 
by labor interests and some influential members of the U.S. Congress 
as having definite advantages especially because of its entitlement and 
related features. In the course of the Congressional hearings held in 
the spring of 1991 with regard to granting the President fast-track 
authority to enter into the negotiation of a NAFTA, it was evident 
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that there was a strong undercurrent of opposition to the fast track 
because of fears that a NAFTA would be detrimental to U.S. 
employment. While the results of the present study indicate that these 
fears may not be justified, it may nonetheless be important on political 
grounds to respond to them.4i' 
This suggests accordingly, that it may not be judicious politically 
to advocate the total abandonment of TAA. In these circumstances, 
we recomrnend that the best features of EDWAA and TAA be 
combined. In this connection, as Bednarzik (1991, p. 3)  notes, from 
EDWAA this would include: availability of assistance to displaced 
workers regardless of the factors resulting in their displacement; rapid 
i-esponse teams; ability to start assistance before displacement occurs; 
joint labor-management cornrnittees and local community involvement 
in helping to reemploy workers; and systematic tracking of prograrn 
outcomes. From TAA, this would include: entitlement to income 
support; entitlement to training; and the ability to cany over funds 
on a three-year cycle. Job search and relocation assistance would also 
he provided. 
There appears to be a consensus among those involved in the 
adrninistration and analysis of the existing adjustment assistance 
prograrns that providing assistance for job search is the most 
cost-effective way of accomplishing the reemployment of displaced 
workers. Yet assistance for worker training has a great deal of appeal, 
and there may in fact be cases in which workers could benefit from 
special, longer term support for training in basic skills and in the 
acquisition of new skills. The question then would be to change the 
TAA prograrn in ways that would speed up the certification procedure 
43) A discussion of the political rationale for a prograrn of TAA is to be found especidy 
in Aho and Bayard (1984) and Richardson (1982). 
and broaden the eligibility criteria, emphasize the process of job search, 
and provide incentives for rapid reemployment. At the sarne time, the 
longer-term training features of the TAA program could be maintained 
and improved for those trade-impacted workers in need of longer-term 
a~sistance.~ '  
The results presented in the foregoing tables in the text and in the 
more detailed tables in the Statistical Appendix provide a useful 
starting point in identifying the sectors/ occupations/regions/states 
that may be most vulnerable to a NAFTA. Once the exact details of 
a NAFTA become known and the agreement becomes operative, it will 
then be necessary to monitor the actual adjustments that take place 
and to target the TAA towards those individuals in greatest need of 
income support and retraining. 
The question then to be considered is the adequacy of the existing 
adjustment assistance prograrns and funding in coping with the worker 
dislocation that might be experienced as a consequence of a NAFTA. 
In Section X, an upper bound for lost wages due to a NAFTA 
(scenario D.) was an estimated $40 million annually, for a period of 
ten Years, although this estimate did not take into account the possible 
additional dislocations that rnight occur due to cross-border migration. 
The results in Section XI of a NAFTA accompanied by various 
assumptions about migration led to an approximate doubling of the 
upper bound estimate of lost wages (scenario H.). If adjustrnent 
assistance were to made available for complete coverage of lost wages 
in connection with a NAFTA, the amount required is estimated to be 
between $40 and $80 million annually for a period of ten years. 
The arnounts just noted assume that displaced workers would be 
compensated fully for lost wages due to a NAFTA. This may not be 
44) Rosen (1991) also contains some recornrnendations for improving the TAA program. 
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realistic, however, since the existing programs for income support of 
displaced workers set the proportion of coverage of lost wages at a 
much lower level, typically 40 percent or less of the pre-displacement 
wage. Thus, for example, Friedman (1991) notes that in 1990 the 
average unemployment insurance benefit was 37 percent of the average 
wage in covered employment. Trade readjustment ailowances, which 
can be received when the unemployment benefits are exhausted, are 
set at this same level. If the 37 percent is applied to the lower and 
upper bounds of the wage losses associated with a NAFTA, the arnount 
of assistance required would then be $15 and $30 million annually for 
a penod or ten years.45' 
The question now is how the foregoing calculations relate to the 
current levels of worker displacement and assistance provided under 
TAA and EDWAA. According to Bednarzik (1991) and Jones (19911, 
in fiscal 1990, 38,500 workers were declared eligible for TAA and 
250,000 workers qualified for assistance under EDWAA. Assurning 
that the fiscal 1990 displacement experiences would be characteristic 
of what might occur under a NAFTA, this suggests that 13.34 percent 
(i.e., 38,500/285,500 x 100) of the workers displaced would qualify for 
TAA and 86.66 percent (250,000/285,500 x 100) would quaiify for 
EDWAA. 
While it might be thought that the percentage of workers qualifying 
for TAA due to a NAFTA would be higher than 13.3 percent, it should 
be pointed out that TAA eligibility depends on demonstration of 
trade-related injury while EDWAA eligibility covers al1 types of 
45) Friedrnan also notes that, between 1974 and 1981, the payments made to trade- 
displaced workers were to be equivalent to 70 percent of prior pay. If this 70 percent 
level were chosen, as Friedrnan recommends, the amounts of assistance would then 
be between $28 and $56 million annually for a period of ten years. 
displacement regardless of cause. Because our NAFTA CGE model 
takes into account a variety of interactions arnong the various sectors 
of the U.S. economy, including both sectors that are engaged in trade 
as well as the so-called nontradable (service) sectors, the calculations 
of worker displacement presented are capturing both the direct and 
indirect employment effects of a NAFTA. Workers who are displaced 
due to such indirect effects would be difficult to identify and therefore 
would be unlikely to be certified for TAA. It seems reasonable to 
assume therefore that the percentages of TAA and EDWAA eligible 
workers noted can be applied to the NAFTA-related worker 
displacement effects that have been calculated. 
Famsworth (1991) has reported, based on Department of Labor 
sources, that in fiscal 1990 the TAA payments for income support plus 
training averaged $7,000 per eligible worker, and expenditures for the 
various services provided under EDWAA averaged $1,200 per eligible 
worker. Applying the 13.34 and 86.66 percentages for the proportions 
of workers receiving TAA and EDWAA assistance respectively in 
fiscal 1990, the expected TAA payment is $933.80 (i.e., 13.34% x 
$7,000) and the expected EDWAA expenditure is $1,039.92 (Le., 86.66% 
x $1,200) per eligible worker. The total expected TAA and EDWAA 
payment is then $1,973.72 per eligible worker. 
According to scenario D. in Table 12, 76,623 workers would be 
displaced across sectors as the result of the removal of tariffs coupled 
with an increase of FDI in Mexico. Multiplying the number of displaced 
workers by the combined TAA and EDWAA payment per eligible 
worker gives a total of $151 million as the arnount of assistance 
required over ten years, or about $15 rnillion per year. For scenario 
H. in Table 18, which takes into account cross-border migration, there 
would be a total of 195,210 workers displaced. The arnount of assistance 
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needed in this case would then be $385 million over ten years, or $38.5 
million per year. These amounts correspond reasonably closely with 
the calculations based on the 37 percent wage coverage noted above. 
How do the foregoing amounts compare to what is actually being 
spent annually for the various assistance programs in effect? 
According to the data in Table 20, in fiscal year 1992, JTPA grants 
to states were $2.8 billion, with $577 million earrnarked for EDWAA. 
TAA benefits and training authorizations were $226 million. The 
budgeted authorization for fiscal year 1993 is $577 rnillion for EDWAA 
and $211 million for TAA benefits and training. Assuming that an 
additional budget authorization of $38.5 million annually for a period 
up to ten years were earmarked explicitly to help mitigate wage losses 
that might arise from a NAFTA, this would appear to be quite 
manageable in relation to the existing budget magnitudes for EDWAA 
and other JTPA programs, TAA benefits and training, and 
unemployment compensation and employment services. 
The other calculations of wage losses across occupations, regions, and states 
in Tables 17 and 19 appear to be significantly smaller than the wage losses 
across sectors. Workers who might have to change occupation andlor move 
from one regiodstate to another, could potentially experience significant 
adjustment costs. Yet, on an annual basis, the calculations here suggest that 
these total wage losses could range between about $1.5 and $20 million 
annually. Again, these arnounts appear to be quite small compared to the recent 
and prospective budget authorizations for the various federally funded labor 
market programs. 
The question arises whether any special procedures for allocating adjustment 
assistance should be implemented for the special purpose of dealing with the 
effects of a NAFTA. It might be suggested, for example, that special provisions 
be made for those regions of the U.S. economy that are expected to be hardest 
hit. In view of the relatively small size of the adjustrnents that this study has 
identified as resulting from a NAFTA, however, it does not appear that such 
special provisions would be needed or appropriate. The existing programs do 
have deficiencies that need to be corrected in any case, as has been discussed 
above. But they do not need to be reconstructed specially to deal with a 
NAFTA. 
On the contrary, targetting extra adjustment assistance for particular regions 
in anticipation of the hardships that they may endure prospectively is a 
questionable practice in any case, even assurníng that the identities of those 
regions could be accurately identified through studies such as the present one. 
Allowing such targetting opens up the incentive for regions to waste resources 
lobbying to get that special treatment. In addition, while the effects of a 
NAFTA will indeed be more severe in some regions than in others, those 
individuals who are affected even in regions that are otherwise not hard hit 
deserve the same access to adjustment assistance programs as those 
elsewhere. 
XIV. Surnmary of Results and Policy Options 
An effort has been made in this study to provide a quantitative 
assessment of the economic effects of a NAFTA. While the various 
scenarios analyzed are not exhaustive of al1 the possible changes that 
may be negotiated in connection with a NAFTA, they are nonetheless 
indicative of the orders of magnitude on trade, output, number of f ims ,  
factor returns, and employment that could result from trilateral trade 
liberalization, increased investment in Mexico, and cross-border 
rnigration between Mexico and the United States. 
Overall. the results of the study suggest that the formation of a 
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NAFTA will have positive benefits for the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico on severa1 counts, as follows:"' 
(1) The individual counties al1 experience an increase in aggregate 
welfare. 
(2) The wage gap between the United States and Mexico will 
narrow, thereby reducing the incentive for illegal immigration. 
However, the real wage in the United States still rises as a result of 
trade liberalization. 
(3)  A NAFTA will have beneficial effects through the realization 
of economies of large scale production in al1 three countries. 
(4) A reduction in barriers against foreign direct investrnent in 
Mexico will stimulate new capital forrnation, which has the beneficia1 
ei'fect of alleviating poverty in Mexico. 
(5) The inflow of capital into Mexico may come pnmarily from 
outside the NAFTA, not frorn the United States, suggesting that the 
fear that U.S. firms will relocate production in Mexico may be largely 
unfounded. 
(6)  While there are negative effects on the rest of the world, they 
appear to be relatively small. 
(7) There appears to be relatively little displacement of workers 
especially in the United States, so that the associated adjustment costs 
due to a NAFTA will likely be small. This is the case even when 
allowance is made for cross-border migration between Mexico and the 
United States. 
Al1 of these are effects only of a NAFTA itself, relative to what would 
happen otherwise and for other reasons. They do not include, in 
46) These results are in broad agreement with the results found in a number of other 
modeling studies of a NAFTA. For detaiied comparisons, see Brown (1992) and 
USITC (1992). 
particular, any of the effects of the growth of trade between the U.S. 
and Mexico that is already occurring without a NAFTA and that may 
continue to increase independently of whether a NAFTA is enacted. 
The conclusion that a NAFTA is expected to result in a relatively 
small amount of worker displacement in the United States overall 
suggests that there will be comparably small displacement effects 
when measured across sectors, occupations, and regiondstates. The 
calculated wage losses due to a NAFTA also appear to be fairly small. 
An upper limit may be $40-$80 million and a lower limit may be 
$2.5-20 million annually for a period up to a decade during which the 
full transition to a NAFTA could be expected. The amount of additional 
funding that might be required to help offset these wage losses would 
constitute a small fraction of what is currently being spent in the United 
States for existing federally funded labor market prograrns. 
Currently, EDWAA is the major U.S. labor market program designed 
specifically to assist displaced workers. It offers a flexible array of 
financia1 support and adjustment services at the State and local levels. 
TAA, which is a separate but much smaller program compared to 
EDWAA, is based on the premise that a distinct program is needed 
to assist workers who are displaced by trade. TAA offers income 
support and retraining opportunities. 
In implementing TAA, it has been necessary to develop special 
criteria that distinguish trade from other causes of displacement. This 
creates difficulties, however, because in an economy as large and 
complex as the United States, the effects of trade cannot be readily 
distinguished from other factors that lead to worker displacement. A 
case can be made therefore that the United States should abandon TAA 
and instead concentrate al1 forms of assistance in EDWAA. However, 
while such a change may be justified on econornic grounds, it may 
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not be politically expedient. The fact is that TAA currently has 
considerable support in the Congress and with organized labor 
precisely because of the income support features that provide greater 
certainty of assistance to trade impacted workers. In this light 
therefore, it seems preferable to combine the best features of EDWAA 
and TAA. 
In assessing the present study, it must be borne in rnind that the 
results are based on an economic model that has been designed to 
reflect the economic stmcture and relations within and between the 
individual NAFTA nations. Any model like the NAFTA CGE model 
is of necessity, an abstraction that leaves out many important details 
of econornic life. The modeling framework used in this study has a 
number of limitations, suggesting that further research would be 
~iseful. The directions for additional research include especially the 
need to make allowance for relative wage adjustment in labor markets 
and to clarify the determinants and consequences of foreign direct 
investrnent and cross - border migration. 
On the basis of the foregoing conclusions, we offer the following 
policy options: 
(1) An appropriation of $15-$38.5 million annually be made by the 
U.S. Congress for a penod of ten years for the purpose of providing 
income support and retraining opportunities for U.S. workers who may 
be displaced by a NAFTA. Based on our calculations, this amount 
should be sufficient to cover wages and additional training costs for 
dislocated workers at a level of 40 percent of the pre-displacement 
wage, which corresponds to the percentage wage coverage for 
displaced workers in 1990. 
(2) In view of the relatively small size of the adjustments that may 
result from a NAFTA, the existing arrangements for TAA do not need 
to be reconstructed or targetted to particular sectors, occupations, or 
regions. 
(3) Workers displaced by, a NAFTA should follow existing 
certification procedures in order to be eligible for TAA benefits. 
Because of the difficulty that may be experienced in demonstrating 
that displacement may be due solely to a NAFTA, the eligibility for 
TAA should be broadly construed. This will serve to obviate the need 
to identify a NAFTA as the sole or single most important cause of 
worker displacement. 
(4) The income supports aspects of TAA should be maintained in 
order to assure workers of a well defined safety net in the event that 
they experience displacement due to a NAFTA. Efforts have been made 
in individual States and localities to improve the rapid response tearn 
coordination of TAA and EDWAA. This progress should be continued. 
In particular, it is imperative to provide displaced workers with 
pertinent information and effective assistance for job search and 
relocation and to expedite the availability of retraining in cases where 
it may be needed. 
(5) Further economic analysis of the effects of a NAFTA is 
warranted. It is especially important to devise more effective analysis 
of the relative wage adjustrnents that may occur for workers in 
particular sectors, occupations, and geographic locations than has been 
feasible in the present study. Also, more attention should be given to 
analysis of the determinants and consequences of a NAFTA with 
regard to changes in foreign direct investrnent and cross-border 
rnigration. 
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XV. Irnplications for Further Research 
The research undertaken in this study is by no means the last word 
on the subject of the employment and related effects of a NAFTA. 
In particular, there are a number of directions in which the research 
might be extended. 
One possibility would be to incorporate a certain amount of relative 
wage adjustment into the analysis. As explaíned earlier, this would 
require either information so about, or assumptions regarding, a variety 
of substitution elasticities affecting labor supplies and demands. It may 
be that more information is available on these substitution elasticities 
than the present authors are aware of, and if so this information could 
be incorporated into an extension of the basic model. Alternatively 
various elasticities could simply be assurned in order to determine what 
they imply in a variety of scenarios. In either case it would be necessary 
to modify the cun-ent NAFTA model to allow these elasticities to play 
their appropriate roles. As currently constructed, the only alternative 
to fixed relative wages is to assume that relative wages adjust totally 
to accornrnodate fixed quantities. However, experiments that have been 
carried out along these lines suggest that this assumption leads to 
implausible results. Therefore an expansion of the model to include 
these effects would definitely be necessary. 
Another aspect of the analysis that could be improved would be the 
modeling of labor migration and foreign direct investment. In the 
scenarios reported here, a given amount and direction of these 
international factor movements were assumed. While it is not at al1 
clear what the appropriate strategy for modeling these as endogenous 
factor flows may be, it would nonetheless be desirable to explore the 
implications of severa1 alternatives. Most extreme, of course, would 
be that labor andor capital move intemationally to equalize their 
returns. This, of course, is likely to be excessive. Altematively, 
mechanisms of partial factor mobility rnight be developed. One 
mechanism would be that a certain differential or ratio of returns needs 
to be exceeded before any international factor flow takes place at all. 
Or, as another possibility, factor flows could be modeled as an 
increasing function of the international differential in returns. Both of 
these assunptions would, again, require additions to the current model 
in order to implement them, but those additions should be relatively 
straightfonvard. 
A final extension would be to bring in other deterrninants of 
international direct investment and/or migration than relative 
intemational factor returns. An important example of this would 
involve environmental considerations. It is possible that capital will 
flow more readily in some industries than in others in response, say, 
to the advantages provided by ostensibly lax enforcement of 
environmental regulations in Mexico. Starting with data on the 
vulnerability of various industries to such regulations - which would 
have to be collected - international direct investment could be modeled 
on an industry basis in the hope of capturing the movement of various 
environmentally sensitive industries from the United States into 
Mexico. This rnight considerably alter the sectoral patterns of worker 
displacements that have been calculated in the present study. 
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